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Abstract
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a game, and before the in-
teraction begins each agent observes a limited amount of information about the partner’s aggregate
behavior. We develop a novel modeling approach for such environments and apply it to study the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. We first show that defection is evolutionarily stable for any level of observability and
behavioral noise. Next we classify the Prisoner’s Dilemma into four categories of games, and we fully
characterize when cooperation is evolutionarily stable in each of them.
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83. Keywords: evolutionary stability, random matching, indirect
reciprocity, Prisoner’s Dilemma, image scoring, secret handshake.
1 Introduction
In many economic situations people are involved in short-term interactions that offer opportunities for both
sides to cheat for their own gain at the expense of the others. The lack of future interactions between the
agents limits the possibility to directly punish partners who act opportunistically, while the effectiveness of
external enforcement is limited, e.g., due to incompleteness of contracts, non-verifiability of information, and
court costs. In such situations an agent may obtain information about the partner’s behavior in a sample
of past interactions with other opponents, and condition his own behavior on this information. Examples of
such situations include trade in the medieval world (see, e.g., Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990; Greif,
1993), face-to-face trade in the modern world (see, e.g., Bernstein, 1992; Dixit, 2003), and on-line interactions
in Web sites such as eBay and Airbnb (see, e.g., Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Jøsang, Ismail, and Boyd,
2007).
Overview of the Model Agents in a large population are randomly matched into pairs to play a symmetric
one-shot game. Before playing the game, each agent privately draws a random sample consisting of a finite
number of interactions between his partner and other opponents. For each such interaction he observes a
∗Email: yuval.heller@economics.ox.ac.uk and erik.mohlin@economics.ox.ac.uk. A previous version of this paper was titled
“Stable observable behavior”. We would like to express our deep gratitude to Vince Crawford, Christoph Kuzmics, Bill Sandholm,
Balázs Szentes, Rann Smorodinsky, Satoru Takahashi, Jörgen Weibull, and Peyton Young, as well as to seminar/workshop
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signal that depends on the played action profile. We refer to the number of observed interactions, and the
mapping from action profiles to signals as the observation structure.
Each agent follows a stationary strategy: a mapping that assigns a mixed action to each message that may
be observed. The state of the population is described by a strategy distribution, in which different groups in
the population follow different strategies. If one of these strategies is more successful than the others, then
more agents start to follow it, reflecting a payoff monotonic dynamic process of cultural learning.1
Occasionally a small group of new agents are injected into the population, or a small group of old agents
switch strategy. These agents (called, mutants) choose an arbitrary strategy, in a way that does not have to
respect the payoff monotonic dynamics. If their new strategy is outperformed, then they abandon it. If it is
more successful, then other agents start to follow it. Stability under such dynamics is captured by the static
notion of evolutionary stability. A strategy distribution is evolutionarily (neutrally) stable (Maynard Smith
and Price, 1973) if any sufficiently small group of mutants who follow a different strategy is strictly (weakly)
outperformed.
Behavior is slightly perturbed by two kinds of noise. First, agents occasionally tremble when they take an
action (a` la Selten’s 1975, 1983 notions of extensive-form perfection and limit ESS). These action trembles
can also represent observation noise. Second, agents occasionally tremble when they revise their strategy
choices, whereby they may end up following arbitrary strategies that are not necessarily payoff-maximizing.
These strategy mistakes are similar to “normal-form” perfection a` la Selten (1975) and to “crazy” agents a` la
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982). We refer to the distribution that determines the frequency of
various trembles and mistakes as the noise structure, and we assume that it includes a positive (but possibly
very small) component of strategy mistakes.
Observation Structures and Typology of PDs Our main focus in the paper is the case in which the
underlying game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (henceforth PD). Each player decides simultaneously whether
to cooperate or defect; if both players cooperate they obtain a payoff of one, if both defect they obtain a
payoff of zero, and if one of the player defects, the defector gets 1 + g, while the cooperator gets −l (see left
side of Table 2 in Section 2). It is common to assume that mutual cooperation is the efficient outcome that
maximizes the sum of payoffs, i.e., g < l + 1 (and games without this feature are called non-standard PDs).
We pay special attention to four kinds of observation structures:
1. Observing actions: Observing the partner’s action in each sampled interaction. This is arguably the
most frequently studied structure in the literature (see, e.g., Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Milinski,
Semmann, Bakker, and Krambeck, 2001; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; Berger and Grüne, 2014.)
2. Observing conflicts: Observing in each sampled interaction whether there was mutual cooperation (i.e.,
no conflict; both partners are “happy”) or not (i.e., partners complain about each other, but it is too
costly for an outside observer to verify who actually defected). Such a structure captures the essence
of feedback mechanisms used by Web sites such as eBay and Airbnb.
3. Observing unilateral defections: Observing whether or not the partner was the sole defector.
4. Observing action profiles: Observing the the full action profile in each sampled interaction.
We classify the PD games into 2 by 2 categories (see Figure 1 below):
1Our model also describes a biological process, in which the fitness is increasing in the game payoff.
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1. Offensive/defensive PDs:2 In an offensive PD there is a stronger incentive to defect against a cooperator
than against a defector (i.e., g > l); in a defensive PD the opposite holds (i.e., l > g). If cooperation is
interpreted as exerting high effort, then the defensive PD exhibits strategic complementarity; increasing
one’s effort from low to high is less costly if the opponent exerts high effort. As an illustration, consider
a joint project of cowriting an academic paper in which each author can choose either to work hard or
not. Working hard improves the probability that the paper will be of high quality, but the increment
in expected quality is not worth the extra effort for an individual author. The offensive (defensive) PD
describes papers that are likely to be of high quality if one of the authors (both authors) works hard
(work hard) and the marginal contribution of the other (a single) hard-working author is relatively
small.
2. Acute/mild PDs: Recall that the parameter g may take any value in [0, l + 1]. We say that a PD
is acute if g is in the upper half of this interval, i.e., if g > l+12 , and mild if it’s in the lower half.
The threshold, g = l+12 , is characterized by the fact that the gain from a single unilateral defection is
exactly half the loss incurred by the partner who is the sole cooperator. Hence, unilateral defection
is mildly tempting in mild PDs and acutely tempting in acute PDs. In order for an agent not to be
tempted to defect against a cooperating partner in an acute (one-shot) PD he has to put more than
half as much weight on the partner’s payoff as he puts on his own payoff. Another interpretation of this
threshold comes from a setup (which will be important for our results) in which an agent is deterred
from unilaterally defecting because it induces future partners to unilaterally defect against the agent
with some probability. Deterrence in acute PDs requires this probability of being punished to be more
than 50%, while a probability of below 50% is enough for mild PDs.
Main Results Our first result (Theorem 1) shows that always defecting is evolutionarily stable for any
observation structure and any noise structure. The reason is that defection is the unique best reply to itself:
mutants who cooperate with positive probability against incumbents are strictly outperformed if they are
sufficiently rare, and mutants who always defect against incumbents cannot identify other mutants, and
therefore must also defect among themselves.3
Our remaining results state under which conditions cooperation is also stable (see sketched proofs in
Section 2). All of these results assume that with high probability at least two interactions are sampled . The
results are summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1 below.
Table 1: Stability of Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Category of PD Parameters Observation Structure (at Least 2 Sampled Interactions)Actions Conflicts Action profiles Unilateral Defs.
Mild & Defensive g < min
(
l, l+12
)
Y Y Depends on the
noise structure
Y
Acute & Defensive l+12 < g < l Y N Y
Mild & Offensive l < g < l+12 N Y Y
Acute & Offensive max
(
l, l+12
)
< g N N N Y
2This follows Dixit (2003). Takahashi (2010) calls offensive (defensive) PDs submodular (supermodular).
3In general games, we show that any symmetric strict equilibrium is evolutionarily stable for any observation function,
provided that the noise mainly includes action trembles.
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Firstly, we analyze observation of actions, and we show that cooperation is stable if and only if the PD
is defensive. Specifically, Theorem 2 shows that defection is the unique neutrally stable outcome in offensive
PDs for any noise structure and any number of observed actions. The intuition is that in offensive games,
it is better to defect against partners who are likely to cooperate than against partners who are likely to
defect, and this implies that mutants who always defect are more likely to induce incumbent partners to
cooperate. Consequently, defecting mutants outperform incumbents who cooperate. Theorem 3 shows that
cooperation is evolutionarily stable in defensive PDs for any noise distribution when the players observe at
least two actions. The stability of cooperation is sustained by a population in which everyone cooperates
against a partner who always cooperated, and defects against a partner who defected at least twice. In
addition, with some probability (which is determined by the noise structure), agents also defect against a
partner who defected at least once.4
Secondly, we analyze observations of conflict. Theorem 4 shows that cooperation is stable if and only if
the PD is mild. Specifically, we show that cooperation is evolutionarily stable in any mild PD for any noise
structure when agents observe at least two interactions. As in the previous result, cooperation is sustained
by a population in which everyone cooperates (defects) against a partner whose sample contains no (at least
two) conflicts and, in addition, agents defect with some probability against a partner who was involved in a
4The noise structure also determines whether each agent defects at the individual level when he observes a single defection, or
whether the population is heterogeneous and includes two groups, such that agents in the first (second) group defect (cooperate)
when they observe a single defection. Note that this mixed strategy is distinct from the strategy Generous Tit-For-Tat (GTFT)
(Molander, 1985; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). The latter strategy defects with positive probability even after observing two or
more defections.
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single conflict. In contrast, there is no noise distribution and no number of observed interactions that allow
cooperation to be stable in acute PDs. The intuition is that in acute PDs, cooperation requires that any
agent who is involved in a conflict be punished with a probability of at least 50%, but this implies that any
conflict induce on expectation at least one more conflict, which implies that conflicts are “contagious” and
induce everyone to defect.
Thirdly, we analyze observations of unilateral defections, and we show (Theorem 5) that when agents
observe at least two interactions, cooperation is evolutionarily stable in any PD and any noise structure (and
the supporting heterogeneous population is analogous to the one in the previous results).5 This implies that
if a central planner can design the observation structure, then she can pick no better mechanism than the
one that only allows players to observe whether there were unilateral defections or not.
Finally, we analyze observation of action profiles, and we show that revealing the entire action profile
may be bad for supporting cooperation. Specifically, Theorem 6 shows that cooperation is not stable with
respect to any (some) noise structure in any acute (mild) PD when agents observe action profiles. The
intuition is that the severity of punishments required in acute PDs implies that the conditional probability
of the partner following a strategy mistake is lower when a player observes unilateral defection than when
he observes a bilateral defection, which implies that unilateral defections are punished less severely than
bilateral defections, which does not allow one to sustain stable cooperation. In mild PDs the same argument
works if and only if the strategy mistakes lead agents to play strategies that defect with high probability.
Variants and Extensions We study four variants and extensions. First we discuss how to extend our
results to a setup in which agents may choose non-stationary strategies that condition their play on their
own past behavior (and we discuss the dynamic interpretation of our static model). Second, we discuss how
to extend our results to the case in which both messages are observed by both players (public signals). The
third extension sketches how to apply the model to study the evolution of subjective preferences that may
differ from the material payoffs. Finally, we study how the invasion barriers of cooperation and defection
change as the number of observations increases.
Contribution and Related Literature A substantial literature studies the possibility to sustain stable
cooperation when agents in a large population are randomly matched to play the PDs (see, e.g., Nowak and
Sigmund’s (2005) survey on indirect reciprocity). The literature mainly studies four different setups: (1)
strangers: players receive no information about the partner’s behavior, (2) first-order information: a players
observes past interactions that his partner was involved in (as in our model), (3) second-order information:
a player observes what information the partner had in past interactions, and (4) binary reputation: a player
observes a binary “label” (e.g., good or bad) about the partner, which is automatically updated according to
her behavior by some external reputation mechanism.6
It is well known that if the population is infinite and the matching is uniform, then defection is the unique
stable outcome of the PD when there are no observations: the strangers, information condition. A few papers
(e.g., van Veelen, García, Rand, and Nowak, 2012; Alger and Weibull, 2013) support stable cooperation by
assuming that the matching is sufficiently assortative, i.e., that cooperators are more likely to interact with
5We further show that in “non-standard” PDs in which g > l+ 1 and mutual cooperation is no longer the efficient outcome,
no observation structure can sustain stable cooperation.
6See also Rosenthal (1979) who presented an early model for random matching with observation of the partner’s last action;
and Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001) that show that cooperation occurs at a positive fraction of the time in a PD with pre-play
communication, which can be used as “secret handshake” a` la Robson (1990).
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other cooperators.7 Our paper shows that letting players observe the partner’s behavior in two interactions
is enough to support stable cooperation without assuming assortativity.
Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) (see also Deb, 2012) analyze finite populations, and show that if players
are sufficiently patient, then stable cooperation can be supported by “contagious” equilibria: if one player
defects at stage t, his partner defects at period t+1, infecting another player who defects at period t+2, and
so on. These “contagious” equilibria have two main drawbacks: (1) a single “crazy” agent who always defects
is enough to induce everyone to defect (see Ellison, 1994, p. 578), and (2) experimental evidence suggests
that people typically do not follow contagious strategies (see, e.g., Duffy and Ochs, 2009). Our contribution
with respect to this literature is to show that letting players observe two of the partner’s past actions is
enough to sustain stable cooperation, in a way that is robust to crazy agents, and that is consistent with
experimental evidence on intuitive “tit-for-tat”-like behavior (see, e.g., Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Seinen
and Schram, 2006; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2015).
In an influential paper, Nowak and Sigmund (1998) present the mechanism of image scoring to support
cooperation when players observe the partner’s past actions (first-order information). In this mechanism,
each player observes several past actions of the partner, and he defects if and only if the partner’s frequency
of defection is above some threshold (see also the recent extension in Berger and Grüne, 2014). Experimental
evidence suggests that observation of past actions substantially increases the level of cooperation (though the
level of cooperation is somewhat lower than with second-order information or binary reputation mechanisms),
and that many subjects seem to follow image-scoring strategies (see, e.g., Milinski, Semmann, Bakker, and
Krambeck, 2001; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009). A few papers have raised concerns about the stability
of cooperation with image-scoring mechanisms. Specifically, Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) demonstrated
in simulations that cooperation is unstable, and Panchanathan and Boyd (2003) analytically studied the
case in which each agent observes a single action. Our paper makes two key contributions with respect the
literature on image scoring. First, Theorem 2 shows that image scoring cannot sustain stable cooperation
in defensive PD games, regardless of the number of observed actions. Second, Theorem 3 presents a novel
variant of image scoring, and proves that it can support cooperation in any defensive PD even when the
players observe only two past actions. Our analysis shows the importance of differing between defensive and
offensive PDs when modeling real-life behavior, as each kind of PD leads to qualitatively different predictions,
and implies novel testable predictions for lab experiments.8
Takahashi (2010) studies the stability of cooperation when a player observes the entire history of the
partner’s past play. Takahashi shows that there is a sequential (strict) equilibrium that induces cooperation
in any PD (if and only if the PD is defensive). Our analysis makes two related key contributions. First, we
show that cooperation is stable in any defensive PD also when players observe two actions only. Second,
we show that defection is the unique stable outcome in offensive PDs also when using the mild, evolution-
arily motivated, solution concept of neutral stability rather than the strong notion of strict equilibrium; in
particular, this implies that none of the sequential equilibria in Takahashi (2010) are neutrally stable.9
7See also Herold (2012) that studies the evolution of cooperation in a related “haystack” model in which individuals inter-
act within separate groups, and Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) that study stable cooperation in a “voluntarily
separable” repeated PD, in which each player can unilaterally end and start with a randomly assigned new partner.
8To the best of our knowledge there is no experimental data about the influence of various values of l and g on the rate
of cooperation in the PD interactions with random matching and observations of past actions. Our model predicts novel and
qualitatively different comparative statics than those observed in experiments of the repeated PD (played by the same two
partners); see, e.g., Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011); Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011); Breitmoser (2015).
9In Heller (2015a) one of the authors of this paper adapts the analysis to a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (against the same
partner) with private monitoring, and shows that all the sequential equilibria in the existing equilibria are unstable in a strong
sense (they are vulnerable to an arbitrarily small group of agents who always defect).
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Some papers study the stability of cooperation when players also have second-order information; i.e.,
they can observe something about the past interactions of the past opponents of the current partner. The
experimental evidence suggests that this second-order information helps to achieve a somewhat higher level
of cooperation, as it helps to differentiate between justified and unjustified defections. However, assessing
second-order information seems to carry a substantial cognitive cost for the subjects, leading many of them
to look only at first-order information (see, e.g., Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels, 2005; Gong and Yang, 2010).
Our paper shows that a coarse (and hence more easily processed) form of first-order information that indicates
only whether there was a unilateral defection or not, can sustain cooperation also in an offensive PD game
by using simple and intuitive strategies. This novel prediction can be tested in lab experiments (to the best
of our knowledge there exist no experiments that have tested it).
In a seminal book Sugden (1986) studies binary reputation (also called good standing; see related models
in Kandori, 1992; Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006). In this mechanism, all
agents initially have a “good label”; an agent obtains a “bad label” by defecting against a “good” partner.
The labels in this model are determined automatically by an exogenous process. Such mechanisms of binary
reputations can support stable cooperation, and they seem to fit experimental behavior well when subjects
observe the reputation of each partner; see, e.g., Stahl (2013). A main drawback of this approach is the
requirement of having an exogenous central mechanism that manages the reputations of all players. Without
such a central mechanism, it is very demanding for a player to evaluate his partner’s reputation, as it depends
on long histories of play of many players (because the reputation of one agent depends on the reputations of
his past partners). Our main contribution is to show that the players observing the partner’s behavior in two
interactions is enough to support stable cooperation without requiring an external reputation mechanism.
Finally, our paper has two interesting novel insights to convey about the design of online feedback mech-
anisms (see, e.g., Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Jøsang, Ismail, and Boyd, 2007). We first show that the
plausible feedback mechanism in which players observe conflicts (without observing which side is the cause of
the conflict) can yield stable cooperation iff the PD is mild. Second, we prove that observation of unilateral
defections is an optimal feedback mechanism, and that it can sustain stable cooperation in any PD.
Methodological Contribution So far we have ignored a subtle aspect of the model: a strategy distri-
bution might not uniquely determine the behavior in the population. For example, if each agent observes a
single action (for sure), then any mixed action is consistent with the strategy of playing the observed action.
Here we describe how we deal with this complication in the model.
An outcome is a mapping that describes the mixed action played by each group in the population condi-
tional on being matched with individuals from each other group. An outcome is consistent with the strategy
distribution if, for any two strategies in the support of the strategy distribution, it is the case that if the
observations are sampled from the outcome, then the induced play coincides with the mixed actions described
by the outcome. A configuration is a pair consisting of a strategy distribution and a consistent outcome.
Following Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), we say that a configuration is unstable if some small invasion
can move the configuration far away, either because the invading mutants outperform the incumbents, or
because the entrants’ presence necessarily causes a large change in aggregate behavior. Specifically, we say
that a configuration is evolutionarily (neutrally) stable if after a sufficiently small group of mutants have
entered the population: (1) there is a nearby post-entry configuration in which the incumbents play similarly
to their pre-entry behavior, and (2) the mutants are strictly (weakly) outperformed in any (at least one)
nearby post-entry configuration. All of our results hold with this adaptation of evolutionary stability to
7
configurations.
Structure Section 2 presents motivating examples and illustrates our main results. The model is presented
in Section 3, and our solution concept is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 contains our main results. We
discuss variants and extensions in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The formal proofs appear in the appendix.
2 Illustrations of the Main Results
In this section we present some motivating examples, and sketch an overview of our main results.
Table 2: Matrix Payoffs of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Games
c d
c 1
1 −l 1+g
d 1+g
−l
0
0
PD (g, l > 0 , g < l + 1)
c d
c 1
1 −0.1 1.5
d 1.5
−0.1
0
0
PD1 (Offensive Mild PD)
c d
c 1
1 −15 10
d 10
−15
0
0
PD2 (Defensive Acute PD)
Prisoner’s Dilemmas The left side of Table 2 presents the payoff matrix of a PD that depends on two
positive parameters g and l. When both players play action c (cooperate) they both get a high payoff
(normalized to one), and when they both play action d (defect) they get a low payoff (normalized to zero).
When a single player defects he obtains a payoff of 1+g (i.e., an additional payoff of g) while his opponent gets
−l. The central payoff matrix of Table 1 presents an example (PD1) of an offensive mild PD (0.5 · (l + 1) >
g > l) with g = 0.5 and l = 0.1. The right side presents an example (PD2) of a defensive acute PD
(l < g < 0.5 · (l + 1)) with g = 9 and l = 15.
Defection is Evolutionarily Stable Theorem 1 shows that defection is evolutionarily stable for any small
level of noise and any observation structure. The proof can be sketched as follows. The positive level of noise
implies that all possible messages are observed with positive probability. Defecting with probability one
regardless of the observed message is the unique strict best reply to itself. On the one hand, mutants who
always defect against incumbents must also always defect among themselves. This is because such a mutant
has no way of telling whether he is being matched with an incumbent or another mutant, since the partner’s
observed behavior is identical to that of the incumbents. On the other hand, mutants who cooperate against
incumbents with an average probability of α > 0 cooperate against other mutants with at most an additional
probability of k · α. The reason is that such a mutant can cooperate against another mutant only when
he observes that the other mutant cooperates in at least one of the k observed interactions. This implies
that such mutants suffer a loss of α · l from cooperating against incumbents, while their maximal gain from
inducing cooperation from fellow mutants is  · (k + 1) ·α, where 0 <  << 1 is the fraction of mutants in the
population. Thus if  is sufficiently small, then the mutants are strictly outperformed.
Only Defection is Stable in Offensive PDs when Agents Observe Actions Theorem 2 shows that
always defecting is the unique neutrally stable strategy distribution in any offensive PD for any small level
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of noise, when each agent observes the partner’s actions. The sketch of the proof is as follows. Assume
that strategy distribution σ is neutrally stable. The payoff of a strategy in the PD can be divided into two
components: (1) direct component: defecting yields an additional g points if the partner cooperates and
an additional l points if the partner defects, and (2) indirect component: the strategy’s average probability
of defection determines the distribution of actions observed by the partners, and thereby determines the
partner’s probability of defecting. For each fixed average probability of defection q the fact that the PD is
offensive implies that the optimal strategy among all those who defect with an average probability of q is
to defect with the maximal probability against the partners who are most likely to cooperate. This implies
that all agents who follow incumbent strategies are more likely to defect against partners who are more
likely to cooperate. As a result, mutants who always defect outperform incumbents because they both have
a strictly higher direct payoff (because defection is a dominant action) and a weakly higher indirect payoff
(since incumbents are less likely to defect against them).
Specific Structure of Observation and Noise In the following sketched proofs we assume that each
player observes two of his partner’s interactions before playing, and that there is a single source of noise:
a fraction δ of the agents in the population defect with a probability of 20% regardless of the observed
message. The assumptions are made to simplify the exposition. General noise structures (which are dealt
with in the formal results) yield essentially the same stable strategy distributions, except that: (1) some
noise structures induce agents to mix at the individual level (rather than having two groups of agents, each
following a different deterministic strategy), and (2) the probability that a player defects when he observes a
single defection depends on the noise structure (it is increasing in the average probability of defection of the
strategy mistakes).
Stable Cooperation in Defensive PDs when Agents Observe Actions Theorem 3 shows that co-
operation is evolutionarily stable in defensive PDs when agents observe actions.
We now demonstrate how to sustain stable cooperation in PD1 (Table 2). Consider a heterogeneous
distribution with two strategies in its support: 70.6% of the population defect iff they observed two defections
(Tit-For-2-Tats strategy, abbreviated TF2T ), and the remaining agents (29.4%) defect iff they observed at
least one defection (Tit-For-Tat strategy, abbreviated TFT ). In what follows we sketch an explanation of
why this distribution is evolutionarily stable and can yield full cooperation when noise vanishes (δ → 0). We
focus on outcomes in which the average probability that TFT - or TF2T agents defect is O (δ). Throughout
the calculations we neglect terms of O (δ) and O
(
δ2
)
when the leading term is O (1) and O (δ), respectively.
Table 3: Frequency of Defections in the Stable Population in PD1
Probability of Defection by Row str. Calculation of Conditional Probabilities
Frequency 29.4% 70.6% δ Pr (d|str.) Pr (d,c|str.) Pr (d,c|str.) ·Pr (type) Pr (str.|d,c)Strategy TFT TF2T Noise
TFT 2 · δ 0.08 · δ 36% δ 2·δ 0.59·δ 61%
TF2T O
(
δ2
)
O
(
δ2
)
4% 0.04·δ 0.08·δ 0.06·δ 6%
Noise 20% 20% 20% 20% 32% 0.32·δ 33%
First, we calculate the defection probability of each strategy against each other strategy, as presented in
the left side of Table 3. The event of a player observing a single defection is denoted by (d, c). The various
probabilities are consistent with the strategies in the sense that: (1) the TFT probability of defection against
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each partner is equal to the probability that a TFT -player observes the partner defecting at least once in
two random interactions (i.e., it is 1− (1− Pr (d|str.))2, where Pr (d|str.) is the probability that the column
strategy, abbreviated to str., will defect); (2) the TF2T probability of defecting against a partner is equal to
the probability that a TF2T player observes the partner defect twice in two random interactions (i.e., it is
Pr (d|str.)2); and (3) noisy agents defect with a probability of 20%.
Next we have to show that both actions are best replies when agents observe a single defection. The
right side of Table 3 calculates the probability that a player observes a single defection conditional on being
matched with each strategy. By using Bayes’ rule, we can then calculate the probability that a player is
matched with each strategy conditional on the player observing a single defection. It turns out that the
conditional probability of being matched with a noisy agent is ~33%. As noisy (non-noisy) agents defect
with a probability of 20% (O (δ)) against a non-noisy partner, it implies that the probability that a partner
will defect conditional on the player observing a single defection by the partner is 33% · 20% ≈ 6.5%. As a
result, a player’s direct expected gain from defecting, conditional on having observed a single defection, is
6.5% · l + 93.5% · g = 6.5% · 15 + 93.5% · 9 = 9.4, and since an observation of a single defection occurs with
probability 0.294 · 0.59 · δ+ 0.706 · 0.006 · δ+O (δ2) = 0.178 · δ, a player’s expected gain from defecting after
observing single defections is 0.178 · δ · 9.4. This turns out to be equal to the indirect loss of defecting. To
see this, note that the probability that a future partner is a TFT agent who observes a single defection is
increased by 0.178 · δ · 2 · 29.4% when one defects after observing single defections, and the TFT partner’s
defection yields a loss of 11 points, so that the total indirect cost, conditional on the player having observed
a single defection, is 29.4% · 2 · 16 ≈ 9.4.
The next step is to note that defection (cooperation) is the unique best reply after a player observes two
defections (cooperations). This is because after a player has observed two defections (two cooperations),
the conditional probability that the partner defects is higher (lower) than 6.5%, which implies that the
direct gain from defecting is strictly larger (smaller) than the indirect future loss. This implies that any
sufficiently small group of mutants who behave differently after observing two defections (cooperations) is
strictly outperformed.
The fact that both actions are best replies after a player observes a single defection implies that TFT and
TF2T yield the same expected payoff. Moreover, the relative payoffs in this heterogeneous population are
qualitatively similar to the payoffs in a “Hawk-Dove” game, where it is well known that the heterogeneous
population is evolutionarily stable. To see why, consider a small group of invading mutants who defect after
observing a single defection with an average probability of q 6= 29.4%. These mutants are strictly outperformed
due to the following argument. If q > 29.4% (q < 29.4%%), then the aggregate probability that a player
defecting after observing a single defection, would induce a future opponent to defect is higher (lower) than
2 · 29.4% in the post-entry population, so that the indirect cost of defecting increases (decreases), while the
direct benefit of defecting remains approximately the same. This implies that cooperating (defecting) after
one has observed a single defection is the unique best reply, and the mutants who defect (cooperate) more
often in these cases (relative to the incumbents) are outperformed.
Finally, mutants who defect with an average probability of 29.4% after they observe a single defection
but mix at the individual level are outperformed because the supermodularity of defensive PDs implies that
the payoff of a strategy as a function of its own defection probability is strictly convex (because defecting
more often implies that the partners are more likely to defect against the agent, which makes defection more
profitable in a defensive PD).10
10Other noise structures in which agents with noisy strategies defect after observing (c, c) and cooperate after observing (d, c)
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Stable Cooperation in Mild PDs when Agents Observe Conflicts Theorem 4 shows that coopera-
tion is evolutionarily stable when agents observe conflicts (i.e., whether or not there was mutual cooperation)
iff the PD is mild. We now demonstrate how to sustain stable cooperation in the mild PD1. Consider a
distribution with two strategies in its support: 77.2% of the population defect iff they observed two defections
(TF2T ), and the remaining agents (22.8%) defect iff they observed at least one defection (TFT ). In what
follows we sketch why this distribution is evolutionarily stable and can yield full cooperation when noise
vanishes (δ → 0).
Table 4: Frequency of Defections in the Stable Population in PD1
Probability of Defection by Row st. Calculation of Conditional Probabilities
Freq. 22.8% 77.2% δ Pr (D|st.) Pr (D,C|st.) Pr (D,C) ·Pr (type) Pr (st.|D,C)Strategy TFT TF2T Noise
TFT 40·δ 1.4·δ 71% 20.3·δ 40.6·δ 9.2·δ 85%
TF2T O
(
δ2
)
O
(
δ2
)
21% 0.65·δ 1.3·δ 1·δ 10%
Noise 20% 20% 20% 46% 49.7% 0.5·δ 5%
First, we calculate the defection probability of every player’s strategy against every other player’s strategy,
as presented in the left side of Table 4 (neglecting terms of O (δ) and O
(
δ2
)
when the leading term is O (1)
and O (δ), respectively). The various probabilities are consistent with the strategies in the sense that: (1) the
probability than a TFT agent defects against a partner is equal to the probability that the player observes at
least one conflict; i.e., it is 1− (1− Pr (D|str.))2, where D denotes the signal of having a conflict in a random
interaction of the partner; (2) the probability that a TF2T agent defects against a partner is equal to the
probability that he observes conflicts in both of the partner’s observed interactions; i.e., it is Pr (D|str.)2;
and (3) the noisy agents defect with a probability of 20%.
Next we have to show that both actions are best replies when one observes a single conflict. The right
side of Table 4 calculates the probability that a player observes a single conflict (denoted by (D,C) in
the table) conditional on being matched with each strategy. By using Bayes’ rule, we can then calculate
the probability of a player being matched with each strategy, conditional on the player observing a single
conflict. This probability turns out to be 5% for the noisy agent. Thus the probability that a partner will
defect conditional on the player observing a single conflict is 5% · 20% ≈ 1%, and the direct expected gain
from defecting is 1% · l+ 99% · g = 1% · 0.1 + 99% · 0.5 ≈ 0.495. This is equal to the indirect loss of defecting:
99% ·2 ·22.8% ·1.1 ≈ 0.495. To see this, note that defection changes the signal from “no conflict” to “conflict”
iff the partner cooperates (which happens with a probability of 99%), and each such rare signal of conflict
is observed, with an average probability of 2 · 22.8% by a future TFT partner who then induces a loss of
l + 1 = 1.1. Finally, arguments similar to those presented above show that defection (cooperation) is the
unique best reply after a player observes two (zero) conflicts, and that mixing at the individual level after
the player observes a single defection yields a worse payoff.
Unstable Cooperation in Acute PDs when Agents Observe Conflicts We now sketch why one
cannot sustain stable cooperation in any acute PD (i.e., PDs with g > l+12 ) when each player observes
whether there was conflict in a sample of k interactions. Cooperation can be a stable outcome only if
cooperating is a best reply to a cooperative partner. First consider a mutant with small mass of  who
can induce the opposite case in which the payoff of an agent is a concave function of the agent’s own defection probability. In
such cases, the stable population is homogeneous, and all agents mix with the same probability after observing a single defection.
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defects with a very small but positive average probability of z. A player’s direct gain from defecting against a
partner who cooperates is z ·g. A player’s indirect loss is approximately z ·k ·q · (l + 1), where q is the average
probability that an incumbent defects after observing a single defection. The mutants are outperformed only
if z · g < z · k · q · (l + 1). The acuteness of the PD implies that 0.5 · (l + 1) < g < k · q · (l + 1)⇒ k · q > 0.5.
Note that the mutants induce a fraction 2 ·k · q ·  · z of incumbents to defect due to observing the fraction
of  ·z conflicts that are directly induced by the mutants (recall that each defection induces a signal of conflict
for both participating agents). Next, the fraction of 2 ·k ·q · ·z new conflicts will induce an additional fraction
(2 · k · q)2 ·  · z of defections by incumbents who observe these new conflicts. Iterating the process will show
that the total number of induced conflicts is proportional to the sum of a geometric sequence with parameter
2 · k · q > 1, which converges to infinity. This implies that an entry of a small group of defecting mutants is
“contagious” in the sense that it induces all the incumbents to defect, which implies that cooperation cannot
be a stable outcome.
Stable Cooperation in Any PD when Agents Observe Unilateral Defections The arguments
for how players may support stable cooperation when they observe unilateral defections are similar to the
previously sketched proofs for the case of when they observe conflicts. However, there is one key difference.
In this observation structure every defection by a mutant induces a “bad” signal to at most one of the
interacting agents (rather than to both of them), which implies that the geometric sequence of the total
fraction of induced defections has a parameter of k · q (rather than 2 · k · q), and thus the problem of a small
group of mutants that induces the entire population to defect happens only when g > l + 1 (rather than
when g > l+12 ), which exactly characterizes “non-standard” PDs (in which, unlike the standard PDs, mutual
cooperation is not the efficient outcome).
Unstable Cooperation when Agents Observe Action Profiles Finally, we sketch why cooperation
is not stable in acute (mild) PDs when agents observe action profiles for all (some) of the noise structures.
A population may support stable cooperation only if: (1) the incumbents on average defect with a positive
probability of q > 0 when they observe a single unilateral defection (this is necessary for cooperation to be
the best reply to a cooperator), and (2) the incumbents defect with a smaller average probability when they
observe a single bilateral defection (this is necessary for cooperation to be the best reply to a defector).
On the one hand, a direct calculation of the behavior in the interactions between noisy and non-noisy
agents (similar to those presented in the tables above) shows that the total frequency of unilateral defections
of non-noisy agents is larger than those of noisy agents if either: (1) the PD is acute, because then the
total frequency of non-noisy agents’ unilateral defections is the sum of a geometric sequence with parameter
k · q ≥ 0.5 as discussed above, or (2) the noisy agents defect with a probability of at least 23 (this defection
probability is so high as to imply that the non-noisy agents always defect against these noisy agents, and
thus the noisy agents are never being observed to be the sole defectors).
On the other hand, mutual defections are very rare among incumbents (O
(
δ2
)
). This implies that most
bilateral defections occur when at least one of the interacting agents follows a strategy mistake. This implies,
that when a player observes a bilateral (unilateral) defection, the conditional probability that the partner
follows a strategy mistake and is more likely to defect is approximately (less than) 50%. As a result it is
more beneficial for agents to defect when they observe a bilateral defection, which contradicts requirement
(2) above.
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3 Model
3.1 Environment and Observation Structure
We present a reduced-form static analysis of a dynamic evolutionary process of cultural learning (or, alter-
natively, of a biological evolutionary process) in a large population of agents. The agents in the population
are randomly matched into pairs and play a symmetric one-shot game G. Formally, let G = (A, pi) be a
two-player symmetric normal-form game, where A is a finite set of actions (|A| ≥ 2), and pi : A× A → R is
the payoff function. As is standard in the evolutionary game theory literature, we interpret the payoffs as
representing “success” (or “fitness”).
Let ∆ (A) denote the set of mixed actions (distributions over A), and let pi be extended to mixed actions in
the usual way. We use the letter a (α) to denote a typical pure (mixed) action. With slight abuse of notation
let a ∈ A also denote the element in ∆ (A), which assigns probability 1 to a. We adopt this convention for
all probability distributions throughout the paper.
Remark 1. The assumption that the game is symmetric is essentially without loss of generality (if G is played
within a single population). Asymmetric games can be symmetrized by considering an extended game in
which agents are randomly assigned to the different player positions with equal probability, and strategies
condition on the assigned role (see, e.g., Selten, 1980).
An observation structure is a tuple Θ = (p,B, o), where p ∈ ∆ (N) is a distribution (with a finite support)
over the number of observed interactions, B is a finite set of signals that can be observed for each interaction,
and the mapping o : A×A→ ∆ (B) describes the probability of observing each signal b ∈ B conditional on
the action profile played in this interaction (where the first action is the one played by the current partner,
and the second action by her opponent).
Before playing the game, each player independently samples k independent interactions of his partner
(where k is distributed according to p). Let M denote the set of all possible messages (profiles of signals)
given observation structure Θ, i.e., M =
{∪k∈C(p)Bk}, and let m denote an element of M . We let 0
be included in N and assume that B contains an empty message Ø that is observed when k = 0 . An
environment is a pair E = (G,Θ), where G is the game and Θ is the observation structure.
We pay special attention to four kinds of observation structures:
1. Observation actions: Observing the partner’s actions, i.e., B = A and o (a, a′) = a.
2. Observation of action profiles: B = A2 and o (a, a′) = (a, a′) .
3. Observation of conflicts (in PDs): Observing whether or not there was mutual cooperation. That is,
B = {C,D}, o (c, c) = C, and o (a, a′) = D for any (a, a′) 6= (c, c).
4. Observation of unilateral defections (in PDs): Observing unilateral defections of the partner. That is,
B = {C,D}, o (d, c) = D, and o (a, a′) = C for any (a, a′) 6= (d, c).
In each of these four cases, we identify the observation structure Θ with the distribution p.
3.2 Strategies and Outcomes
A strategy is a mapping s : M →4 (A) that assigns a mixed action to each possible message. Let sm ∈ 4 (A)
denote the mixed action played by strategy s after observing message m. That is, for each action a ∈ A,
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sm (a) = s (m) (a) is the probability that a player who follows strategy s plays action a after observing
message m. We also let a denote the strategy s ≡ a that plays action a regardless of the message.
Let S denote the set of all strategies, and let Σ ≡ 4 (S) denote the set of finite support distributions
over the set of strategies. An element σ ∈ Σ is called a strategy distribution (or simply distribution). Let
σ (s) denote the probability that strategy distribution σ assigns to strategy s. Given a strategy distribution
σ ∈ Σ, let C (σ) denote its support (i.e., the set of strategies such that σ (s) > 0). We interpret σ ∈ Σ as
representing a population in which |C (σ)| strategies coexist, and each agent is endowed with one of these
strategies according to the distribution of σ. When |C (σ)| = 1, we identify the strategy distribution with
the unique strategy in its support (i.e., σ ≡ s), in line with the convention adopted above.
Remark 2. Our model focuses on stationary strategies in which the agent’s behavior depends only on the
message about the partner, but not on the agent’s own past play or on time. We discuss how to interpret
and relax this assumption in a dynamic setup in Section 6.1.
Given a finite set of strategies S˜ ⊂ S, an outcome η : S˜×S˜ →4 (A) is a mapping that assigns to each pair
of strategies s, s′ ∈ S˜ a mixed action ηs (s′), which is interpreted as the mixed action played by an agent with
strategy s conditional on being matched with a partner with strategy s′. Let OS˜ ≡ (4 (A))(S˜×S˜) denote the
set of all outcomes defined over the set of strategies S˜. The strategy distribution and the outcome together
determine the payoffs earned by each agent in the population. Outcome η ∈ OS˜ is pure if there exists action
a ∈ A such that ηs (s′) = a for each s, s′ ∈ S˜. We denote such a pure outcome by η ≡ a.
We now present a few definitions that take as given: a strategy distribution σ ∈ Σ, an outcome η ∈ OC(σ),
and a strategy s ∈ C (σ). Let ηs,σ ∈ 4 (A) be the mixed action played by an agent with strategy s when
being matched with a random partner sampled from σ. Formally, for each action a ∈ A:
ηs,σ (a) =
∑
s′∈C(σ)
σ (s′) · ηs (s′) (a) .
Let ψs,σ,η ∈ 4 (A×A) be the (possibly correlated) mixed action profile that is played when an agent with
strategy s is matched with a random partner sampled from σ. Formally, for each (a, a′) ∈ A×A, where a is
interpreted as the action of the agent with strategy s, and a′ is interpreted as the action of his partner:
ψs,σ,η (a, a′) =
∑
s′∈C(σ)
σ (s′) · ηs (s′) (a) · ηs′ (s) (a′) .
Given a messagemk = (bi)1≤i≤k ∈ Bk, let νs,σ,η (mk) denote the probability that a profile of k independent
observations of interactions between strategy s and a random partner is equal to m:
νs,σ,η
(
(bi)1≤i≤k
)
=
∏
1<i≤k
∑
(ai,a′i)∈A2
m (ai, a′i) (bi) · ψs,σ,η (ai, a′i) .
Let νs,σ,η (k) ∈ ∆
(
Bk
)
be the induced distribution over messages in Bk (with νs,σ,η (0) (Ø) = 1).
3.3 Consistent Outcomes, Configurations, and Payoffs
Fix environment (G,Θ). When individuals are drawn to play the game their actions are determined by their
strategies and the messages they observe. Suppose that the observed messages are sampled from outcome
η and the players play according to the strategy distribution σ. This induces a new outcome. We require
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outcomes to be consistent with the strategy distribution in the sense that they generate observations that
induce the current outcome to persist. Formally, given a distribution σ ∈ Σ, let fσ : OC(σ) → OC(σ) be the
mapping between outcomes that is induced by σ.
(fσ (η)) s (s′) (a) =
∑
k∈C(p)
p (k) ·
∑
mk∈Mk
νs,σ,η (mk) · s (mk) (a) .
Outcome η ∈ OC(σ) is consistent with distribution σ if it is a fixed point of this mapping: fσ (η) ≡ η. The
standard Lemma 1 shows that each distribution admits a consistent outcome.
Lemma 1. For each strategy distribution σ ∈ Σ there exists a consistent outcome η.
Proof. Observe that the space OC(σ) is a convex and compact subset of a Euclidean space, and that the
mapping fσ : OC(σ) → OC(σ) is continuous. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem implies that the mapping σ has
a fixed point, which is a consistent outcome by definition.
Some distributions induce multiple consistent outcomes. For example, if each player observes a single
action for sure, then any outcome η ∈ Os˜ is consistent with the distribution that assigns mass 1 to the
“tit-for-tat” strategy (s˜ (a) = a for each a ∈ A). Due to this multiplicity, we introduce the notion of a
configuration, namely, a pair consisting of a strategy distribution and a consistent outcome.
Definition 1. A configuration is a pair (σ, η), where σ ∈ Σ, η ∈ OC(σ), and fσ (η) ≡ η.
Given a configuration (σ, η) and a strategy s ∈ C (σ), let pis (σ, η) be the payoff of a player who follows
strategy s in configuration (σ, η):
pis (σ, η) =
∑
(a,a′)∈A×A
pi (a, a′) · ψs,σ,η (a, a′) .
Given a distribution of strategies σ′ with a weakly smaller support than σ (C (σ′) ⊆ C (σ)), let piσ′ (σ, η) be
the payoff of a player with a strategy sampled according to σ′ in configuration (σ, η):
piσ′ (σ, η) =
∑
s′∈C(σ′)
σ′ (s′) · pis′ (σ, η) .
Remark 3. In Heller and Mohlin (2015b) we show that all strategy distributions in an environment admit
unique consistent outcomes iff the expected number of observed actions is less than one.
4 Noise and Evolutionary Stability
4.1 Noise Structures and Perturbed Environments
Our main results deal with assessing the stability of pure outcomes, such as the stability of populations of
agents who always cooperate. However, the strategy of each incumbent describes his behavior also after he
observes defections, which are never played on the equilibrium path. The stability analysis can therefore
make sense only if one explicitly models the sources of off-path behaviors. In what follows, we define a broad
notion of behavioral noise that allows for mistakes both in the choice of actions and in the choice of strategies.
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A noise structure describes the relative frequency of each mistake that agents may commit. The first
component, ξ, describes the relative frequency of choosing each pure action (i.e., each mapping from messages
to pure actions) by mistake in each round. These mistakes are similar to the trembles in the definitions of
extensive-form perfect equilibrium and limit ESS; see Selten, 1975, 1983. The second component, S, describes
a finite set of strategies that the agents may follow by mistake. The strategy mistakes are similar to the
mistakes that are dealt with in normal-form perfection, and to the “crazy” strategies that are followed with
small probability in reputation models such as Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982).11 The third
component, λ, describes the relative frequency of each strategy mistake.
Definition 2. Let E = (G,Θ) be an environment. A noise structure is a tuple ζ = (ξ,S, λ):
1. Function ξ : A → R+ assigns a non-negative number to each action such that ∑a∈A ξ (a) ≤ 1, which
describes the relative frequency of action trembles.
2. S ⊆ S is a finite set of strategy mistakes.
3. Function λ : S → R+ assigns a positive number to each strategy mistake s ∈ S s.t. ∑s∈S λ (s) ≤ 1.
Remark 4. All our results remain the same if we require each ξ (a) to be positive.
In what follows we focus on noise structures that contain a grain of full-support strategy mistakes.
Specifically, we require that for each distribution of observed messages, there exist two different strategies in
S, and that at least one of them have full support (i.e., it plays all actions with positive probability).
Definition 3. Given strategy s and distribution µ ∈ ∆ (M), let sµ =
∑
m µ (m) · sm ∈ ∆ (A) be the
distribution of actions played by an agent who follows strategy s and observes a message sampled from µ.
Definition 4. Noise structure ζ = (ξ,S, λ) has a grain of full-support strategy mistakes if for each distribution
over the set of observed messages µ ∈ ∆ (M), there exist strategy mistakes s, s′ ∈ S such that (1) sµ is totally
mixed (i.e., sµ (a) > 0 for each a ∈ A), and (2) sµ 6= sµ′ .
We interpret µ as the distribution of messages that is induced by the incumbent configuration. The first
requirement (that sµ be totally mixed) implies that any observed message might be the result of a strategy
mistake. This rules out noise structures in which some messages can only be the result of action trembles (or
cannot be induced at all). The second requirement is that there be two strategies in S that induce different
plays, and thus the observed message may change the posterior probability about the partner’s likely play.
This rules out “degenerate” noise structures in which the entire population (including the mistake strategies)
play exactly the same, and thus the observed message is completely irrelevant in assessing the likely action
of the partner.
Given an environment E = (G,Θ), a noise structure ζ = (ξ,S, λ), and a noise level 0 < δ < 1, we define
E (G,Θ, ζ, δ) to be the perturbed environment in which agents make mistakes at an order of magnitude of δ,
and the mistakes are distributed according to ζ. That is, each agent trembles and chooses action a by mistake
with a probability of δ · ξ (a) in each round, and a fraction of δ ·λ (s) of the population follows strategy s ∈ S
by mistake.
To give a formal definition of E (G,Θ, ζ, δ), we need some auxiliary notation and concepts. Let Sξ,δ ⊆ S
be the set of strategies that assign a probability of at least δ ·ξ (a) to each action a after any observed message.
11See Abreu and Sethi (2003) for a model in which related behavioral types are evolutionarily stable.
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This is the set of strategies that respect the noise structure ζ and the noise level δ. For each strategy s ∈ S,
let sξ,δ ∈ Sξ,δ be the projection of s onto Sξ,δ; that is, for each a ∈ A
sξ,δ (a) = min
max {s (a) , δ · ξ (a)} , 1−∑
a′ 6=a
δ · ξ (a′)
 .
Let Sξ,δ be the set of these projections. This is the set of strategy mistakes that are adjusted to respect the
noise structure ζ and the noise level δ.
A strategy distribution σ ∈ Σ is included in the convex set of feasible perturbed strategy distributions
Σζ,δ ⊆ Σ iff: (1) the support consists entirely of strategies that respect the noise structure ζ and the noise
level δ, i.e., C (σ) ⊆ Sξ,δ, and (2) all strategy mistakes that are adjusted to respect ζ and δ receive a weight
that respects ζ and δ, i.e., for each s ∈ Sξ,δ, σ (s) ≥ δ · λ (s) . The perturbed environment E (G,Θ, ζ, δ) is
defined similarly to the unperturbed environment E (G,Θ), except that the set of strategy distributions is
limited to Σζ,δ. Note that E (G,Θ, ζ, 0) is the original unperturbed environment. Further note that if ζ has
a grain of full-support strategy mistakes and δ > 0, then any configuration (σ, η) such that σ ∈ Σζ,δ induces
all messages with positive probability.
4.2 Post-Entry Focal Configuration
Our static concepts are intended to capture stable behavior in a dynamic process of cultural learning. We
imagine a large population of agents. At each point in time every agent has a strategy that he currently
follows. Agents regularly receive the opportunity to change their strategies. Such revisions go in the direction
of the currently more successful strategies (i.e., payoff-monotonic selection dynamics). Occasionally a small
group of agents, called mutants, switch to an arbitrary strategy, in a way that does not have to respect the
payoff monotonic dynamics.
We consider incumbents distributed according to σ∗ and a small group of invading mutants (with a small
mass  > 0), who play a different distribution of strategies σ′. Following the entry, the post-entry distribution
of strategies gives a weight of 1 −  to the incumbent strategy distribution and a weight of  to the mutant
strategy distribution. Following such an entry, the behavior of the population is assumed to converge to
a consistent outcome of this post-entry strategy distribution. The speed at which behavior converges to a
consistent outcome is assumed to be much faster than the speed at which the strategy distribution evolves in
line with a payoff-monotonic learning process. Thus we can assume that the payoffs obtained in consistent
outcomes are the ones that are relevant to the long-run composition of the strategy distribution.
Formally, given 0 <  < 1 and two strategy distributions σ∗, σ′ ∈ Σ with relative masses of 1 −  and ,
let σ = σσ∗,,σ′ denote the -post-entry strategy distribution:
σ (s) = (1− ) · σ∗ (s) +  · σ′ (s) for each s ∈ C (σ) ∪ C (σ′) ,
and let an -post-entry configuration be any configuration consisting of the -post-entry strategy distribution
and a consistent outcome: (σ, η).
We say that a strategy is noisy if the strategy distribution assigns to it the minimal probability required
by the noise structure. Formally, given strategy distribution σ ∈ Σζ,δ in noisy environment E (G, p, ζ, δ), an
incumbent strategy s ∈ C (σ) is noisy if σ (s) = δ ·λ (s), and it is non-noisy otherwise, i.e., if σ (s) > δ ·λ (s).
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We pay special attention to focal post-entry configurations in which the non-noisy incumbents play simi-
larly to their pre-entry behavior.
Definition 5. Given a noisy environment E (G,Θ, ζ, δ), a strategy distribution σ ∈ Σζ,δ, a configuration
(σ, η), and numbers  > 0 and φ ≥ 0, we say that a post-entry configuration (σ, η) is φ-focal if for any two
non-noisy incumbent strategies s, s′ ∈ C (σ), and every action a, it holds that, |ηs (s′) (a)− (η)s (s′) (a)| ≤ φ.
4.3 Evolutionary Stability
A strategy distribution is evolutionarily (neutrally) stable if following an entry of a small group of mutants:
(1) there exists a post-entry focal configuration, and (2) the mutants are strictly (weakly) outperformed in
any (at least one) post-entry focal configuration. Formally:
Definition 6. Fix a perturbed environment E (G,Θ, ζ, δ). The configuration (σ∗, η∗), where σ∗ ∈ Σζ,δ, is
evolutionarily stable if for each strategy σ′ 6= σ∗ ∈ Σζ,δ, and each φ¯ > 0, there exists ¯ > 0 and 0 ≤ φ < φ¯,
such that for each 0 <  < ¯: (1) there exists a φ-focal -post-entry configuration; and (2) in any φ-focal
-post-entry configuration (σ, η):
piσ′ (σ, η) < piσ∗ (σ, η) .
The configuration (σ∗, η∗) is neutrally stable if for each strategy σ′ 6= σ∗ ∈ Σζ,δ, and each φ¯ > 0, there exists
¯ > 0 and 0 ≤ φ < φ¯, such that for each 0 <  < ¯: (1) there exists a φ-focal -post-entry configuration; and
(2) there exists a φ-focal -post-entry configuration (σ, η):
piσ′ (σ, η) ≤ piσ∗ (σ, η) .
The first condition requires that there be a post-entry configuration in which the outcome is close to the
pre-entry behavior. If this condition is violated, then a small invasion can move the outcome far away, and
thus the configuration is not stable. For example, consider an environment in which each agent observes a
single action, and plays the observed action. Assume that initially the consistent outcome is that everyone
cooperates. This configuration is unstable, because an arbitrarily small invasion of mutants who always defect
would result in a post-entry strategy that has a unique outcome in which everyone defects.
The second condition requires the mutants to be outperformed in focal post-entry configurations: a strong
requirement for evolutionary stability (strictly outperformed in all focal post-entry configurations), and a mild
requirement for neutral stability (weakly outperformed in at least one focal post-entry configuration). The
focus on focal post-entry configurations is motivated by informally considering the underlying dynamics,
as Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007). Prior to the entry, the incumbent strategies have played against one
another long enough to settle on the consistent outcome η∗, and it seems plausible that entry by a small
group of new types will not undo this (see the dynamics presented in Section 6.1).
Note that when there are no observations (p (0) = 1), our definitions coincide with the classical definitions
of evolutionary and neutral stability (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973).
Remark 5. A few comments are in order.
1. Our results about the stability of defection hold even if we require that all post-entry configurations
be focal, or require that mutants outperform incumbents even in post-entry configurations that are not
focal. In particular, always defecting is evolutionarily stable (Theorem 1) if the focality requirement is
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modified in any of these ways. Moreover, one can show that no other strategy is perfectly evolutionarily
stable (Theorem 2) with such an alternative definition (however, one cannot show that any other
strategy is perfectly neutrally stable without our chosen definition of focality). However, the results on
the stability of cooperation (Theorems 3–6) rely on only considering focal post-entry configurations to
some extent, as the incumbent’s strategy has two consistent outcomes, one in which almost everyone
cooperates, and the other in which almost everyone defects. However, in these cases one can show that
plausible dynamics like those presented in Section 6.1 would only yield the focal post-entry configuration.
2. Our results remain the same if we only allow homogeneous groups of mutants who follow a unique
(non-noisy) strategy.
3. In Remark 9, we discuss the implication of requiring that all incumbent strategies outperform the
mutants rather than only requiring that the incumbents outperform the mutants on average, and we
explain why the alternative definition is arguably too strong.
4.4 Perfect Evolutionary Stability
A configuration is perfectly evolutionarily stable if it is the limit of evolutionarily stable configurations in a
sequence of perturbed environments where the noise level converges to zero. Formally:
Definition 7. Fix environment E = (G,Θ). A sequence of strategies (sn)n converges to strategy s if for
each message m ∈M and each action a, the sequence of probabilities (sn)m (a) converges to sm (a) .
Definition 8. Fix environment E = (G,Θ). A sequence of configurations (σn, ηn) converges to a con-
figuration (σ∗, η∗) if: for each pair of strategies s, s′ ∈ C (σ∗) , there exist sequences of strategies (sn)n
and (s′n)n such that: (1) (sn)n → s and (s′n)n → s′, (2) σn (sn) → σ∗ (s) and σn (s′n) → σ∗ (s′), and (3)
(ηn)sn (s
′
n)→ (η∗)s (s′).
Definition 9. Configuration (σ∗, η∗) is perfectly evolutionarily (neutrally) stable in environment E = (G,Θ),
if there exist a noise structure ζ with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes, a converging sequence of
configurations (σn, ηn)n → (σ∗, η∗), and a converging sequence of noise levels (δn)n → 0, such that each
configuration (σn, ηn) is evolutionarily (neutrally) stable in the perturbed environment E (G,Θ, ζ, δn). In
this case we say that (σ∗, η∗) is perfectly evolutionarily (neutrally) stable with respect to noise structure ζ.
If η∗ ≡ a∗ ∈ A, then we say that a∗ is a perfectly evolutionarily (neutrally) stable outcome.
The definition of perfect evolutionary stability is analogous to Selten’s (1975, 1983) notions of perfect
equilibrium and limit ESS, with one difference: Selten’s notions considered only action trembles, while our
notion of stability deals with richer noise structures, and requires that they have a grain of full-support
strategy mistakes (however, action trembles are allowed to be the most frequent kind of mistakes). In
particular, when there is no observability (p (0) = 1), our definition of evolutionary stability coincides with
Selten’s definition of limit ESS.
The stability of a perfectly evolutionarily stable configuration depends on a specific noise structure. The
following definition of strictly perfect evolutionary stability is more robust in the sense that it requires stability
with respect to any noise structure (similar to strict perfection of Okada, 1981, and to strict limit ESS of
Heller, 2015b). Formally:
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Definition 10. Configuration (σ∗, η∗) is strictly perfectly evolutionarily stable in the environment E = (G,Θ),
if for any noise structure ζ with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes, there exist a converging sequence
of configurations (σn, ηn)n → (σ∗, η∗), and a converging sequence of noise levels (δn)n → 0, such that each
configuration (σn, ηn) is evolutionarily (neutrally) stable in the perturbed environment E (G,Θ, ζ, δn).
Our analysis in Section 5.1 characterizes under what circumstances cooperation can be a stable out-
come. We say that a pure outcome is strictly perfectly stable if for any noise structure there is a perfectly
evolutionarily stable configuration (with respect to this noise structure) that induces this outcome.
Definition 11. Action a∗ is a strictly perfectly evolutionarily stable outcome in the environment E = (G,Θ),
if for any noise structure ζ with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes, there exist a converging sequence
of configurations (σn, ηn)n → (σ∗, η∗), and a converging sequence of noise levels (δn)n → 0, such that: (1)
each configuration (σn, ηn) is evolutionarily (neutrally) stable in the perturbed environment E (G,Θ, ζ, δn),
and (2) η∗ ≡ a∗.
5 Main Results
5.1 Stability in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Stability of Defection in all Environments Our first result shows that always defecting is evolutionarily
stable in any PD game, for any observation function and any noise structure.12 Recall that (d, d) represents
the configuration in which everyone use the strategy of always defecting, which induces defection as its unique
consistent outcome. Formally:
Theorem 1. Let E = (G, p) be an environment where G is a PD game. The configuration (d, d) is strictly
perfectly evolutionarily stable.
Observation of Actions The following two results show that under observation of actions the stability
of cooperation crucially depends on whether the PD is offensive or defensive. In the former case (g > l) only
defection is stable (Theorem 2 ), while in the latter case (g < l), cooperation is also stable (Theorem 3).
Theorem 2 shows that defection is the unique neutrally stable strategy distribution in any offensive PD.
Theorem 2. Let E = (G, p) be an environment with observations of actions, where G is an offensive PD.
If (σ∗, η∗) is a perfectly neutrally stable configuration, then (σ∗, η∗) = (d, d).
Remark 6. Other outcomes may be neutrally stable in offensive PDs in two cases (both ruled out by our
assumption that the noise structure has a grain of full-support strategy mistakes). First, if there is no noise
at all, cooperation may be neutrally stable. The stability relies on the players cooperating iff the partner has
never defected. However, if a player observes a defection then it is not in his interest to defect, because that
will increase the probability of others defecting against him in the future. In order to avoid this problem
one must make the implausible assumption that players never observe defections. Second, there might be a
“degenerate” noise structure in which all players following noisy strategies defect with the same probability
as the incumbents. This implies that the observed message is entirely uninformative about the partner’s
expected behavior. In this case a positive probability of cooperation might be supported by incumbents who
tend to defect more after they observe messages with more frequent defections.
12When there is no noise at all, always defecting is only neutrally stable (and the game admits no evolutionarily stable
strategies) because mutants who differ only in their off-the-equilibrium path behavior obtain the same payoff as the incumbents.
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Remark 7. Relatively simple adaptations to the arguments of the proof of Theorem 2 show that, in the bor-
derline case in which g = l, always defecting is the unique perfectly evolutionarily stable strategy. Moreover,
this uniqueness result holds (for any g ≤ l) also if we allow for noise structures without a grain of full-support
strategy mistakes.
Theorem 3 shows that if players observe at least two actions, then cooperation is stable in any defensive
PD and given any noise structure.13 Formally:
Theorem 3. Let E = (G, p) be an environment with observations of actions, where G is a defensive PD
(g < l), and p ≡ k ≥ 2. Then cooperation is a strictly perfectly evolutionarily stable outcome.
We sketched the proof and the construction in Section 2 for a specific noise structure. In what follows we
sketch how to adapt the construction to any noise structure. Recall that in the supporting stable configuration
the (non-noisy) agents cooperate (defect) when they observe zero (at least two) defections, and they defect
with an average probability of q when they observe a single defection. Each noise structure induces (when
the noise level converges to zero) a posterior probability of 0 < µ < 1 that the partner defects conditional on
the player observing a single defection. Note that µ > 0 due to our assumption that the noise structure also
includes a grain of full-support strategy mistakes.
For each µ, there is a unique frequency 0 < q (µ) < 12 · ll+1 for which both actions are best replies for a
player who observes that his partner has defected once. This frequency exactly balances the direct gain and
the indirect loss from defecting against such a partner. The direct gain is µ · l+ (1− µ) · g) and the indirect
loss is k · q · (1 + l), since each rare instance of defection is observed by on average a fraction of k · q partners,
and each such observation induces the partner to defect with a probability of q and to yield a loss of l + 1.
Given this q, both actions yield the same payoff when a player observes a single defection. The remaining
arguments presented in Section 2 explain why the configuration is evolutionarily stable.
Remark 8. As discussed in the proof, the noise structure determines whether the stable population is het-
erogeneous and includes a group with mass q of TFT agents and a remaining group of TF2T agents, or
whether it is homogeneous and all (non-noisy) agents defect with a probability of q when they observe a
single defection.
Remark 9. Following the entry of a small group of mutants who defect with a probability of q′ < q after they
observe a single defection, the payoff of the mutants is less than the average incumbents’ payoff, but it is
more than the payoff of the TF2T players. However, this does not influence the stability of the heterogeneous
population of TFT and TF2T agents in plausible smooth dynamics. The mutants have a lower payoff than the
average payoff, and thus gradually disappear from the population, while the TFT (TF2T ) becomes somewhat
more (less) frequent. As soon as the mutants disappear, TF2T outperforms TFT until the frequency of the
TFT group returns to its original value of q.
Observation of Conflicts Next we show that under the observation of conflicts (i.e., whether or not there
was mutual cooperation in each interaction), the stability of cooperation crucially depends on whether the
PD is mild (g < 0.5 · (l + 1)) or acute (g > 0.5 · (l + 1)). Specifically, Theorem 4 shows that cooperation
is (not) evolutionarily stable in any mild (acute) PD under any noise structure. The reader is referred to
Section 2 for the sketched proofs of the remaining results.
13To simplify the notations and the formal proofs we assume in the results on the stability of cooperation that players observe
a fixed number k ≥ 2 of interactions. The results can be extended to the case of players observing a random number of
interactions, which may include infrequent instances in which agents observe fewer than two actions.
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Theorem 4. Let E = (G, p) be an environment with observation of conflicts, where G is a PD and p ≡ k ≥ 2.
1. If G is a mild PD (g < l+12 ), then c is a strictly perfectly evolutionarily stable outcome.
2. If G is an acute PD (g > l+12 ), then c is not a perfectly neutrally stable outcome.
Observation of Unilateral Defections Next we show that under the observation of unilateral defections
(i.e., whether or not the partner was the sole defector), cooperation is strictly perfectly evolutionarily stable
in any (standard) PD, while cooperation is unstable in non-standard PDs (in which mutual cooperation is
not the efficient action profile) under any observation structure.
Theorem 5. Let E = (G, p) be an environment with observation of unilateral defections, where G is a PD.
1. If G is a standard PD ( g < l+1), and p ≡ k ≥ 2 , then, cooperation is a strictly perfectly evolutionarily
stable outcome.
2. If G is a non-standard PD (g > l + 1), then, c is not a perfectly neutrally stable outcome.
Observation of Action Profiles Theorem 6 shows that under the observation of action profiles, cooper-
ation is perfectly (but not strictly) stable in mild PDs: the stability is sensitive to the properties of the noise
structure, and it holds only if the agents who follow noisy strategies defect with relatively small probability
when they observe a profile of mutual cooperation. If the PD is acute, then stable cooperation cannot be
supported.
Theorem 6. Let E = (G, p) be an environment with observation of action profiles, where G is a PD game
and p ≡ k ≥ 2.
1. If G is mild ( g < l+12 ), then cooperation is a perfectly evolutionarily stable outcome, but it is not a
strictly evolutionarily stable outcome.
2. If G is acute (i.e., g > l+12 ), then cooperation is not a perfectly neutrally stable outcome.
5.2 Stability of Equilibria in Other Games
Our final result extends Theorem 1 (the stability of defection) to any strict Nash equilibrium a∗ of any
underlying game. However, the stability result for the general case holds only for some noise structures
(defection in the PD is stable in all noise structures because it is a dominant action). In particular, it holds
for noise structures in which the mistakes are either mostly (1) action trembles, or (2) strategy mistakes
that assign high probability to playing action a∗. In either of these noise structures, players assign a high
posterior probability to the event that the partner is going to play a∗ regardless of the observed message,
and thus playing a∗ is the unique best reply. Formally:
Proposition 1. Let E = (G, p) be any environment. If (a∗, a∗) is a strict pure Nash equilibrium of G, then
the configuration (a∗, a∗) is perfectly evolutionarily stable.
Remark 10. An inefficient strict equilibrium (say, (a∗, a∗)) of a coordination game is stable only for the noise
structures mentioned above. In contrast, if the noise structure mainly includes noisy strategies in which
agents always play the same pure action, then a∗ will not be stable. The intuition is as follows. Assume that
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the incumbents play a∗ (when there are no mistakes). Conditional on a player observing the partner mostly
playing the efficient equilibrium action (say, a′), it is very likely that the partner is following a strategy
mistake of playing a′ with high probability. As a result the unique best reply given this observation is a′.
However, this implies that mutants who always play a′ will outperform the incumbents.
One can wonder whether Proposition 1 can be strengthened to demonstrate the stability of some non-
strict equilibria of the underlying games. Example 1 suggests that this is not the case. It shows that the
unique symmetric equilibrium of the underlying game, which is also an ESS and satisfies all the standard
equilibrium refinements, is destabilized for any small positive level of observability.
Example 1. Consider the following Hawk-Dove game:
d h
d (dove) 1, 1 0.5, 1.5
h (hawk) 1.5, 0.5 0, 0
Each action is the strict best-reply to the other action, and α∗ = (0.5, 0.5) is the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium, as well as an ESS of the underlying game. We now show why the configuration (α∗, α∗) is not
neutrally stable if p (0, 0) < 1. To simplify the argument we assume that each agent may observe only a
single action, but the argument can be extended to arbitrary observation functions (and to any Hawk-Dove
game). Consider a mutant strategy distribution that assigns equal weights to three strategies: (1) always
play h, (2) always play d, and (3) play the opposite of the observed action, and play each action with equal
probability if Ø was observed. Intuitively, the past behavior of the mutants is informative as to the strategy
they use, and this allows them to coordinate on avoiding the inefficient outcome. The mutants obtain the
same payoff as incumbents when facing incumbents (because all actions yield the same payoff against α∗),
but obtain a strictly higher payoff relative to the incumbents when facing other mutants. The reason is
that when two mutants are matched they play the inefficient action profile (h, h) with a probability of only( 1
3
)2 + ( 13)2 · 14 < 14 , while when an incumbent and a mutant are matched they play (h, h) with a probability
of 14 . This implies that the mutants outperform the incumbents in any post-entry configuration.
6 Variants and Extensions
6.1 Dynamical Interpretation and Non-stationary Strategies
Our static model raises two related questions: (1) Which plausible dynamics justify our static solution
concept? (2) How restrictive is our focus on stationary strategies, infinite populations, and infinite-lived
agents? In this section we sketch a dynamic model of a finite population of finite-lived patient players, and
use it to interpret and justify our static model (while leaving the development of a comprehensive formal
dynamic model to future research).
Fix a noisy environment E (G, p, ζ, δ), where E = (G, p) is the environment, 0 < δ << 1 is the noise
level, and ζ = (ξ,S, λ) is the noise structure. Let k¯ be the largest number of observations in the support of
the observation function p. Consider a population that includes a large even number N >> 1 of individuals,
where each individual is endowed with a history and a strategy. The history is a tuple of the recent M >> k¯
action profiles played by the agent and his mentor before him (as described below).14 The strategy of an
agent specifies the mixed action he plays as a function of his own history and the observation he has about
the partner’s past behavior. A stationary strategy is a strategy that depends only on the observation about
14The history can also include the observations about the past partners the agent had in these M interactions.
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the partner (and not on the agent’s own history). We allow for non-stationary strategies too. The feasible
strategies are restricted by the minimal trembling probabilities determined by the noise structure. We assume
that δ ·N of the agents (called crazy agents) follow strategies S (distributed according to λ).
In each round, the agents are randomly matched into pairs. Each agent obtains an observation about
the partner (sampled from the partner’s history according to the observation structure O), and then plays
a mixed action according to his strategy. The realized action profile determines the payoff of each agent in
that round. At the end of each round, each agent dies with a probability of 0 < α << 1. Each individual
who dies is replaced with a new agent. A crazy agent is followed by an identical crazy agent who follows the
same strategy. When a non-crazy agent dies, the new agent randomly chooses one of the incumbents as a
mentor and copies the mentor’s strategy and history. The probability of imitating a mentor is monotonically
increasing in the mentor’s average per-round payoff (c.f. Björnerstedt andWeibull (1996)). The interpretation
is that the young agent joins the mentor as a student/apprentice for some time and learns his strategy, and
the population relates the mentor’s past to the likely future behavior of the apprentice.
Each configuration (σ, η) corresponds to a state of the population that consists of |C (σ)| groups, each
group includes σ (s) · N agents who follow stationary strategy s and have the history that is induced by
outcome η. In addition, states of the population might also include non-stationary strategies (and in this
case they will not correspond to configurations).
We are interested in characterizing the dynamically stable population states under the dynamics described
above. As is standard in the evolutionary game theory literature, we explore stability by considering what
happens to the population after an exogenous inflow of a small fraction of mutants who may follow arbitrary
strategies. Consider any configuration that is not neutrally stable. Such a configuration cannot be dynami-
cally stable because a small group of mutant agents can outperform the incumbents, and as a result more and
more agents will start following the mutant strategy in the following generations. In an evolutionarily stable
configuration each incumbent strategy earns the same expected payoff, and thus the relative frequencies of
these strategies would remain constant. Moreover, since evolutionary stability implies that the mutant agents
will be outperformed and thus be less likely to have followers in future generations, the mutant strategy will
gradually disappear from the population.
Note that the fact that the incumbents follow stationary strategies (under the assumption that the
population is described by a configuration) implies that an agent would not benefit from having a non-
stationary strategy, except possibly on those very rare occasions when an agent has accumulated a history
that is very different from the one induced by the outcome η.15
So far we have described the entry of mutants as discrete and exogenous events, in line with the literature
on deterministic evolutionary dynamics. If we consider a stochastic evolutionary dynamic, by allowing for
a steady but small influx of mutants, it is possible that the population will move away from evolutionarily
stable configurations in the “ultra-long run” (see Samuelson, 1998). This will happen when a rare sequence
of random events induces a large group of mutants and/or shifts the histories of many agents far away.
Remark 11 (Robustness to Sophisticated Agents). Consider an adaptation to the dynamics, such that in
each round a small fraction of the population gets to revise their strategies. Each revising agent chooses a
strategy that best-replies to the aggregate behavior of the population, where he assesses his expected stream
of future payoffs according to a discount factor β < 1. If β is sufficiently close to one, then this adaptation
does not affect the stability analysis. The definition of evolutionarily stable configurations implies that all
15Our model is not suitable for analysis of stability of configurations in which many agents follow non-stationary strategies,
such as contagious equilibria (which are discussed in the Introduction).
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agents already choose long-term payoff-maximizing stationary best replies, and that any other best reply is
strictly outperformed when it has a sufficiently small (positive) mass in the population. If β is sufficiently
close to one, then this holds also for non-stationary strategies, so sophisticated revising agents (who explicitly
best-reply) will not take the population away from the evolutionarily stable configuration.
6.2 Public Messages
In the main model we assume that the message about the opponent’s behavior is private. In some applications
it might be more reasonable to assume that the messages are public. In particular, if we consider an online
interaction between traders through an intermediary Web site that publicly presents feedback about the past
behavior of the traders (e.g., eBay), then the messages about the past behavior (e.g., the trader’s feedback
summary) are public. Another environment in which public messages are a good description is one in which
a player observes the last actions that the partner played in the recent past. In such environments, the
messages are essentially public because each player remembers his own recent history. In what follows we
sketch how our results can be extended to the setup of public messages. To simplify the adaptation of the
results, we assume that players also publicly observe a random continuous variable (“sunspot”).
It is relatively straightforward to show that the stability of defection (Theorems 1–2) remains the same
with public messages, and the proofs require only minor adaptations. That is, defection is stable in any
public observation structure, and only defection is stable with public observation of actions. Moreover, all
the results about the stability of cooperation in the various observation structures (Theorem 3–6) can be
adapted to this setup as well. The population supporting stable cooperation in each of these cases consists
of a single strategy according to which: (1) both players cooperate if both messages include only mutual
cooperation, and (2) if at least one observed interaction includes defection (or conflict/unilateral defection in
the other observation structures), then the players use the continuous public signal to coordinate their play,
and both defect with a probability that is weakly increasing in the number of observed defections.
6.3 Invasion Barriers with Many Observations
Our main results show that in many cases both defection and cooperation are evolutionarily stable outcomes.
In this section we discuss the robustness of these stable outcomes when observability becomes perfect, in the
sense that players observe many interactions sampled from their partners’ behavior. Specifically, we focus
on deterministic observation functions in which agents observe k interactions sampled from the partner’s
behavior, and we study the limit as k →∞.
Define the invasion barrier of a pure outcome ¯ to be the minimal size of a group of mutants that is required
to either (1) outperform the incumbents, or (2) take the population’s behavior closer to the opposite outcome,
i.e., to increase the frequency of the opposite pure action above 50% in all ¯-post-entry configurations. Let
k denote the number of observations (either actions or action profiles). We say that the invasion barrier is
O (1/k) if there are numbers c, k¯ > 0 such that for each k ≥ k¯ the invasion barrier is smaller than c/k.
Our first observation is that the invasion barrier of defection is O (1/k). The destabilizing mutants cooper-
ate with a small probability of 0 < θ << 1 when they observe a partner who always defected, and cooperate
for sure if they observe the partner to cooperate at least once. The direct loss from cooperating against the
defecting incumbents is θ · l. The indirect gain from inducing cooperation between mutants is equal to θ · k
times the size of the mutant’s group. If this size is larger than l/k, the mutants outperform the incumbent.
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Intuitively, the mutants occasionally cooperate against the incumbents, and use this infrequent cooperation
as a way to identify other mutants (i.e., a somewhat costly secret-handshake mechanism a` la Robson, 1990).
Next, we observe that the invasion barrier of cooperation is also O (1/k). For concreteness, we focus on
the case of agents (privately) observing actions in defensive PDs. The stability of cooperation requires agents
to defect with positive probability when they observe a single defection (otherwise mutants who defect with
small probability could invade the population), which implies that they must defect for sure if the partner
is observed to defect at least twice (because in this case the partner is more likely to defect against them
than if only one defection has been observed, and so they cannot be indifferent between cooperation and
defection). This implies that a group of mutants who always defect with a size of, say, 10/k will induce a
post-entry population in which everyone defects with high probability (as each incumbent is likely to observe
the partner to defect at least twice in the set of k observations).
It is possible to support stable cooperation with a uniform invasion barrier (which holds for all k > k¯),
in the case of public messages and public sunspots (as described in Section 6.2). This is because the public
sunspots allow the players to moderate the punishment (probability of defection) after observing several
defections, while with private signals there is no such mechanism to moderate these punishments.
6.4 Evolution of Subjective Preferences
In what follows we sketch how to extend the model to analyze the evolution of subjective preferences.
Each subjective preference ordering is represented by a utility function on A × A. A preference-augmented
configuration is a triple consisting of a finite support distribution over utility functions, a strategy for each
utility function, and a consistent outcome satisfying the requirement that each strategy be a subjective
best reply (i.e, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given the subjective preferences). The definitions of post-entry
configurations, focality, and evolutionary stability can be adapted to this setup quite straightforwardly. One
can then adapt Prop. 1 to this setup, and show that strict equilibrium of the underlying game is neutrally
stable for any observation structure (and that the supporting distribution of preferences can assign mass one
to the material preferences). This contradicts the main stylized result in the literature of the evolution of
preferences that only efficient outcomes may be stable if the observation probability is sufficiently high.
The reason for this apparent contradiction is that the existing literature on the evolution of preferences
(see, e.g., Güth and Yaari, 1992; Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007; Herold and Kuzmics, 2009) assumes that
each agent may directly observe the partner’s preferences. In our model players observe past behavior and
draw inferences about the subjective preferences (a “revealed preferences” approach). We think that our
novel approach can be helpful in future research on the evolution of preferences since (1) it seems more
plausible in some applications, (2) it avoids the issues of ignoring the possibility of “mimicking” mutants
(see the discussion in Robson and Samuelson, 2010, Section 2.5), and (3) it avoids the crucial dependency of
many results in the literature on non-generic preferences (e.g., Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, Prop. 2).
7 Conclusion
We study a setup in which individuals are randomly matched to play a game, and each player may observe
messages about the partner’s behavior. We mainly apply the model to study PDs. We show that defection is
always evolutionarily stable, and we characterize which observation structures and which kinds of PDs allow
cooperation to be sustained. The mechanism that supports cooperation is novel and intuitive.
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Future Research We sketch three interesting directions for future research. The first direction, pursued
in a companion paper by Heller and Mohlin, 2015a, studies a setup in which agents are allowed to exert
effort in deception by influencing the message observed by the opponent. Second, our model assumes that
players directly observe past actions of the partner. In many applications, it seems more plausible that agents
observe only non-verifiable reports about the past interactions of their partner (e.g., the trader’s feedback on
eBay). Finally, some important interactions may be better modeled as asymmetric games between separate
populations (e.g., interactions between consumers and professional sellers), and it will be interesting to extend
our analysis to this setup.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Defection is Strictly Evolutionarily Stable)
Proof. Let k¯ = argmax {C (p)} be the maximal number of observed interactions. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be any
noise structure with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes. Let δ¯ > 0 be a sufficiently small number with
respect to min(l,g)(1+max(g,l))·k¯ . Let (δn)n be any sequence of noise levels converging to 0 that satisfies 0 < δn < δ¯
for each n. For each n let dn be the strategy that defects with a probability of 1− δn · ξ (c) regardless of the
observed message, and let σn ∈ Σζ,δn be such that σn (dδ,ξ) = 1 −
∑
s∈S λ (s). (That is, dn is the strategy
that defects with maximal probability, and σn is the strategy distribution that is closest to d in Σζ,δn .) Let
ηn be a consistent outcome of σn. It is immediate that (σn, ηn) → (d, d). Fix n. We have to show that
(σn, ηn) is an evolutionarily stable configuration in the perturbed environment E (G, p, ζ, δn).
Pick 0 <  < ¯. Let σn ∈ Σζ,δn , σ′ 6= σn, be a mutant strategy, and let (σ, η) be an -post-entry
configuration. It is immediate that (σ, η) is 0-focal because the unique non-noisy strategy dn plays the
same way regardless of the observed message.
We now show that the mutants are strictly outperformed. The fact that σ′ 6= σ∗ implies that the mutants
cooperate with a higher probability than the incumbents when facing a dn partner (because all messages
are observed with positive probability, and σn is the unique distribution of strategies that minimizes the
cooperation probability in Σζ,δn). For each mutant strategy s′ ∈ C (σ′), let βs′ be an additional (average)
cooperation probability of mutant s′ beyond the minimal value due to trembles:
βs′ =
∑
s∈C(σ)
σ (s) · (η)s′ (s) (c)− ξ (c) ≥ 0.
For each two strategies s, s′ ∈ C (σ) , let αs,s′ be the difference in the cooperation probability of an agent
who follows strategy s when facing a partner who follows strategy s′ relative to facing an incumbent partner
who follows strategy dn, and let α¯s′ be the maximum of all absolute values of αs,s′ :
αs,s′ = (η)s (s
′) (c)− (η)s (dn) (c) , α¯s′ = maxs∈C(σ) |(αs,s′)| .
We now derive an upper bound for α¯s′ :
α¯s′ ≤ k¯ · (βs′ + (+ δn) · α¯s′) ⇒ α¯s′ ≤ k¯ · βs
′
1− k¯ · (+ δn)
.
To see why this is the case, note that the LHS is the maximal probability that an agent plays differently when
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facing a mutant s′-partner, than when facing a dn-partner. This is bounded by the probability that the agent
observes the mutant s′-partner (or any of his past opponents) play differently from what play looks like in
interactions involving a dn-partner, in any of the k¯ observed interactions. In each such observed interaction,
the partner plays differently from a dn-agent with a probability of βs′ , and the partner’s opponent in that
interaction plays differently only if she follows either a noisy strategy or a mutant strategy (which happens
with a probability of + δ), and in this case she plays differently with a probability of at most α¯s′ .
The s′-mutants suffer a direct loss of βs′ ·min (l, g) from their higher cooperation probability (relative to
the dn-agents). Their indirect gain (from inducing partners to cooperate more often against them) is at most
(+ δn) · maxs∈C(σ) (αs,s′) · (1 + max (g, l)) ≤ (+ δn) · α¯s′ · (1 + max (g, l)). Thus the loss outweighs the
gain if:
(+ δn) · α¯s′ · (1 + max (g, l)) ≤ (+ δn) · (1 + max (g, l)) · k¯ · βs
′
1− k¯ · (+ δn)
≤ βs′ ·min (l, g) ,
which holds for our choice of ¯, δ¯ as sufficiently small.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 (Only Defection is Stable in Offensive PDs)
Proof. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be a noise structure with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes. Let (σn, ηn)n →
(σ∗, η∗) be a converging sequence of configurations, and let (δn)n → 0 be a converging sequence of noise levels,
such that each configuration (σn, ηn) is neutrally stable in the perturbed environment E (G, p, ζ, δn). That
is, we assume that (σ∗, η∗) is a perfectly neutrally stable configuration. In order to obtain a contradiction
assume that σ∗ 6= d.
Recall that any message m ∈ M is observed with positive probability due to the noise structure. Given
configuration (σn, ηn), message m ∈ M , and strategy s ∈ C (σn), let qm (s) denote the expected probability
that a randomly drawn partner of a player defects, conditional on the player following strategy s and observing
message m about the partner.
We say that a strategy is defector-favoring if the strategy defects against partners who are likely to
cooperate, and cooperates against partners who are likely to defect. Specifically, a strategy is defector-
favoring if there is some threshold such that the strategy cooperates (defects) when the partner’s conditional
probability of defecting is above (below) this threshold. Formally:
Definition 12. Strategy s ∈ C (σn) is defector-favoring given configuration (σn, ηn) if there is some 0 ≤ q¯ ≤ 1
such that, for each m,m′ ∈M , qm (s) > q¯ ⇒ sm (d) = 0, and qm (s) < q¯ ⇒ sm (d) = 1.
The rest of the proof consists of the following four steps.
1. First we show that all non-noisy strategies in σn are defector-favoring. Assume to the contrary that
there is a non-noisy strategy s ∈ C (σn) that is not defector-favoring. Let σ′ be a mutant strategy
distribution that is exactly like the incumbent strategy distribution σn except that a positive fraction
of strategy s is replaced by a strategy s′ that has the same average defection probability as s in a focal
-post-entry population but is defector-favoring (where 0 <  << 1 is taken to be sufficiently small).
The fact that both strategies defect with the same average probability implies that they induce the same
behavior from the partners (since these partners observe identical distributions of messages when facing
s and when facing s′), hence qm (s) = qm (s′). Strategy s′ defects more often against partners who are
more likely to cooperate relative to strategy s. Since the PD is offensive this implies that strategy s′
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strictly outperforms strategy s, which implies that the mutant distribution σ′ strictly outperforms the
incumbent distribution σ.
2. Second we show that all the non-noisy strategies defect with the same average probability in (σ∗, η∗).
Assume to the contrary that there are non-noisy strategies s, s′ ∈ C (σ∗) such that ηs,σ∗ (d) > ηs′,σ∗ (d).
Note that agents who follow strategy s have strictly higher payoff than agents who follow s′ when being
matched with non-noisy agents. This is because strategy s yields: (1) a strictly higher direct payoff
due to playing more often the dominant action d, and (2) a weakly higher payoff against non-noisy
agents, because the fact that it defects more often and all non-noisy agents follow defector-favoring
strategies implies that non-noisy partners defect with a weakly smaller probability when being matched
with agents who follow strategy s (relative to s′). This implies that for a sufficiently small noise
level, the followers of s would have a strictly higher payoff than the followers of s′, which contradicts
(σ∗, η∗) being perfectly neutrally stable (because a sufficiently small group of mutants similar to the
incumbents, except that the strategy s′ is replaced by s, would outperform the incumbents in any
nearby focal post-entry configuration).
3. Next we show that for any non-noisy player it is the case that the probability that the partner defects
conditional on the player observing a message that only includes defections (denoted by message −→d ) is
weakly larger than the probability that the partner defects conditional on the player observing a message
of the same length that also includes cooperation (i.e., qm (s) < q~d (s) for any non-noisy strategy s and
any message m 6= −→d with the same length as −→d ). To see why this is the case, note that the fact that
the noise structure has a grain of full-support strategy mistakes implies that not all noisy strategies
have the same defection probabilities, and thus the signal about the partner yields some information
about the partner’s probability of defecting. The previous step shows that all non-noisy agents defect
with the same probability when the noise level converges to zero, which implies that if the noise level
is positive but very small, then they induce almost the same signal distribution, and thus they induce
almost the same behavior from all partners. Combining this fact with the fact that not all strategies
have the same defection probability, implies that if a player observes a message that only includes
defections, then the partner is more likely to have a higher average defection probability when being
matched with any non-noisy agent (i.e., qm (s) < q~d (s) for any non-noisy strategy s).
4. Thus, any non-noisy agent (who follows a defector-favoring strategy due to the first step) would defect
with a weakly higher probability after observing signal −→d . This implies that if the noise level is
sufficiently small, then a mutant distribution that assigns maximal mass to the strategy that defects
with the highest probability outperforms the incumbents. The mutants achieve a direct higher payoff by
defecting more often, as well as a weakly higher indirect gain by inducing the incumbents to cooperate
more often.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3 (Stable Cooperation in Defensive PDs)
Proof. Let TFT (TF2T ) be the strategy that defects iff the partner is observed to defect at least once
(twice). Let TFTq be the strategy that defects with a probability of q (to be defined later) iff the partner is
observed to defect once, and defects for sure if he is observed to defect twice or more. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be
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a noise structure with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes. Let σ be the strategy that assigns mass q
(defined below) to TFT and mass 1 − q to TF2T . Let σ′ be the strategy that assigns mass one to TFTq.
Let η = η′ ≡ c. Let δ¯ be a number that is sufficiently small relative to 1k·(l+1) . For each n ≥ 1, let δn = δ¯/n.
Let σn (σ′n) be the closest strategy to σ (σ′) in Σζ,δn , i.e.,
σn (TFTξ) = λ¯n · q, σn (TF2Tξ) = λ¯n · (1− q) , σn (TFTq,ξ) = λ¯n where λ¯n = 1− δn ·
∑
s∈S
λ (s) ,
where strategy TFTξ (TF2Tξ, TFTq,ξ) is the same as TFT (TF2T, TFTq), except that the probability of
cooperation (defection) after each observed signal is adapted to lie on the closest boundary of the interval
[δn · ξ (c) , 1− δn · ξ (d)] ([δn · ξ (d) , 1− δn · ξ (c)] ).
For each s ∈ C (σn) or s ∈ C (σ′n), let Pr (d,−→c |s) (Pr (d, d, ...|s)) denote the probability of observing
exactly one defection (at least two defections) conditional on the partner following strategy s. Let Pr (d,−→c )
and (Pr (d, d, ...) be the corresponding unconditional probabilities in configurations (σn, ηn) and (σ′n, η′n),
respectively. When we calculate each of these probabilities we will rely on the fact that δn << 1. Thus we
will neglect terms of O (δn) (O
(
δ2n
)
) when the leading term is O (1) (O (δn)).
We will assume that the sequences of outcomes ηn and η′n are such that ηn, η′n → η ≡ c as n → ∞, and
then show that such ηn and η′n are indeed consistent with σn and σ′n, respectively. Note that ηn, η′n → c
implies that
(
(ηn)s,σn (d)
)
= O (δn) and
(
(η′n)s,σn (d)
)
= O (δn) for all s ∈ C (σ) and s ∈ C (σ′), respectively.
Thus our calculations will rely on the fact that agents are very likely to observe the message ~c (which consists
of k cooperations) from a random opponent; formally, Pr (−→c ) = (1−O (δn))k = 1−O (δn).
The conditional probabilities for a noisy strategy s ∈ S are (with an analogous formula in η′)
Pr (d,−→c |s) = k · ηs (−→c ) (d) · (ηs (−→c ) (c))k−1 +O (δn) ,
P r (d, d, ...|s) = 1− Pr (d,−→c |s)− (ηs (−→c ) (c))k +O (δn) .
To simplify the exposition (with slight abuse of notation) we let TFT q,ξ denote the strategy distribution
that puts probability q on TFTξ and probability 1 − q on TF2Tξ in configuration (σn, ηn). Given message
m, let Pr (m|TFTq,ξ) denote the probability of observing message m, conditional on the partner following
TFTq,ξ in configuration (σ′n, η′n), or following the mix of TFTξ (with a probability of q) and TF2Tξ (with a
probability of 1− q) in configuration (σn, ηn). Thus in both configurations (σn, ηn) and (σ′n, η′n) we have:
Pr (m|TFTq,ξ) = q · Pr (m|TFTξ) + (1− q) · Pr (m|TF2Tξ) .
Note that the non-noisy strategies very rarely defect twice or more in k interactions: Pr (d, d, ...|TFTq,ξ) =
O
(
δ2n
)
. Next we calculate the probability of a non-noisy incumbent generating a message that contains a
single defection. This happens if either (1) one of the k partners is observed to defect twice, or (2) with a
probability of q one of the k partners is observed to defect once, or (3) due to a tremble:
Pr (d,−→c |TFTq,ξ) = k·δn·
∑
s∈S
λ (s)·(Pr (d, d, ...|s) + q · Pr (d,−→c |s))+k·q·Pr (d,−→c |TFTq)+δn·k·ξ (d)+O
(
δ2n
)
.
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Solving this yields (neglecting O
(
δ2n
)
)
Pr (d,−→c |TFTq,ξ) =
k · δn ·
∑
s∈S λ (s) · (Pr (d, d, ...|s) + q · Pr (d,−→c |s)) + k · δn · ξ (d)
1− k · q ,
which is well defined and O (δn) as long as q < 1/k. We can now calculate the unconditional probabilities:
Pr (d,−→c ) = δn ·
∑
s∈S
λ (s) · Pr (d,−→c |s) + Pr (d,−→c |TFTq,ξ) +O
(
δ2n
)
,
P r (d, d, ...) = δn ·
∑
s∈S
λ (s) · Pr (d, d, ...|s) +O (δ2n) .
By using Bayes’ rule we can calculate the conditional probability that the partner uses strategy s ∈ C (σn)
as a function of the observed message:
Pr (s|d,−→c ) = σn (s) · Pr (d,
−→c |s)
Pr (d,−→c ) , P r (s|d, d, ...) =
σn (s) · Pr (d, d, ...|s)
Pr (d, d, ...) .
For a sufficiently large n the conditional probability that the partner follows a noisy strategy is higher the
more defections there are in the observed message:
O (δn) =
∑
s∈S
Pr (s|−→c ) <
∑
s∈S
Pr (s|d,−→c ) <
∑
s∈S
Pr (s|d, d, ...) .
To see that this is the case, note that Pr (d|TFTq,ξ) = O (δn), while Pr (d|s) = ηs (−→c ) (d) + O (δn), for any
noisy strategy, and because of the grain of full-support strategy mistakes there is at least one noisy strategy
s such that ηs (−→c ) (d) > 0.
Given a message m let Pr (TFTq,ξ|d,−→c ) in the configuration (σn, ηn) denote the conditional probability
that the partner follows either TFTξ or TF2Tξ (and denote the conditional probability that the partner follows
TFTξ,q in the configuration (σ′n, η′n)). The calculations above show that we have Pr (TFTq,ξ|d,−→c ) = O (δn),
which implies that limδn→0
(∑
s is noisy Pr (s|d,−→c )
)
> 0. Let µ be the probability that a random partner
defects conditional on a player observing message (d,−→c ) about the partner, and conditional on the partner
observing the message −→c :
µ =
∑
s∈S
Pr (s|d,−→c ) · s−→c (d) +O (δn) . (1)
Note that O (δn) < µ because limδn→0
(∑
s is noisy and s−→c (d) > 0 Pr (s|d,
−→c )
)
> 0. Eq. (1) defines µ as
a strictly decreasing function of q. To see this, note that the term s−→c (d) does not depend on q, and in
Pr (s|d,−→c ) = σn(s)·Pr(d,
−→c |s)
Pr(d,−→c ) the terms σn (s) and Pr (d,
−→c |s) do not depend on q, whereas the term Pr (d,−→c )
is increasing in q.
Next we calculate the value of q (fraction q of TFT agents in (σn, ηn) or mixture probability q in (σ′n, η′n))
that balances the payoff of both actions after a player observes a single defection (neglecting terms of O (δn)).
The LHS of the following equation represents the player’s direct gain from defecting in the rare cases when
he observes a single defection, while the RHS represents the player’s indirect loss induced by partners who
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defect as a result of observing these defections:
µ · l + (1− µ) · g = k · q · (l + 1)⇒ q = µ · l + (1− µ) · g
k · (l + 1) . (2)
Note that Eq. 2 defines q as a strictly increasing function of µ. This implies that there are unique values of
q and µ, satisfying gk·(l+1) < q <
l
k·(l+1) <
1
k and 0 < µ < 1, which jointly solve Eqs. 1 and 2. By standard
continuity arguments, for any n, there exists a frequency qn = q + O (δn) that balances the payoff of both
actions after a player observes a single defection given the noisy distribution of strategies σn.
Observe that defection is the unique best reply when a player observes at least two defections. The direct
gain from defecting is larger than the LHS of Eq. 2, and the indirect loss is still given by the RHS of Eq.
(2). The reason that the direct gain is larger is that non-noisy partners almost never defect twice or more
(the probability is O
(
δ2n
)
), and thus the partner is most likely to follow a noisy-strategy with a defection
probability that is higher than µ (since µ also gives weight to non-noisy strategies that are more likely to
cooperate). This implies that any sufficiently small group of mutants who cooperate with positive probability
after they observe two or more defections is outperformed.
Next, consider mutants with a small mass  << 1 who defect with a probability of α > 0 after they observe
~c (which is the message observed most often when an agent is being matched with a non-noisy incumbent). In
what follows we calculate their expected payoff as a function of α in any nearby focal post-entry configuration,
neglecting terms of O
(
δ¯
)
throughout the calculation.16 Observe that the mutant’s partner observes a single
defection with a probability of k · α · (1− α)k−1, and observes at least two defections with a probability of
1− (1− α)k − k · α · (1− α)k−1. This implies that the mean probability that the partner defects against the
mutant is:
h (α) :=
(
k · α · (1− α)k−1
)
· q + 1− (1− α)k − k · α · (1− α)k−1 = 1− (1− α)k−1 (1− α+ k · α · (1− q)) .
Thus the expected payoff of the mutant is:
pi (α) : = (1− h (α)) · α · (1 + g) + (1− h (α)) · (1− α)− h (α) · (1− α) · l
= 1 + α · g − h (α) · (1 + (1− α) · l + α · g) .
Direct numeric calculation of pi′ (α) yields that pi (α) is strictly decreasing in α for each q > gk·(l+1) . Thus
the “mutant” with α = 0 earns the most, but this is precisely the α of the incumbents.
Next, consider a sufficiently small group of  << 1 mutants who defect (on average) with a probability of
q′ 6= qn after observing a single defection (and play the same as the incumbents otherwise). These mutants
are strictly outperformed due to the following argument. Recall that q is defined such that both actions are
best replies after a player observes a single defection because it balances the direct gain from defecting (which
is independent of qn) and the indirect loss from defecting (which is increasing in qn). If q′ > q (q′ < qn), then
the average probability in a post-entry focal configuration that a partner defects when the player observes a
single defection is  · q′n + (1− ) · qn, which is larger (smaller) than qn. This implies that the indirect loss
of defecting is larger (smaller) than the direct gain, and as a result the mutants who defect with a higher
(lower) probability are outperformed.
16Nearby focal configurations exist due to the same argument as in the analysis of the noisy strategies above (which show
that all the non-noisy strategies defect with a probability of O (δn) as long as q < 1/k).
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Let χ be the probability that a random partner defects conditional on both the agent and the partner
observing a single defection (in the limit as δn → 0):
χ = lim
n→∞
(∑
s∈S
Pr (s|d,−→c ) · s(d,−→c ) (d) + Pr (TFTq,ξ|d,−→c ) · q
)
.
We conclude by showing that if χ > µ (χ < µ), then (σn, ηn) ((σ′n, η′n)) is evolutionarily stable. This is so
because if χ > µ (χ < µ), then conditional on a non-noisy agent observing a single defection, the partner
is more (less) likely to defect the higher the probability with which the agent defects when he observes a
single defection (because then it is more likely that the partner observes a single defection rather than only
cooperation). This implies that when a player observes a single defection, defection is more (less) profitable
the higher the agent’s own defection probability is (recall that the direct gain of defection is higher the larger
the defection probability of the partner, while the indirect loss is independent of the partner’s behavior). That
is, an agent’s payoff is a strictly convex (concave) function of the agent’s defection probability conditional
on him observing a single defection. This implies that mutants who mix on the individual level (defect with
probabilities different from q) are outperformed when χ > µ (χ < µ)). When χ = µ, one can show that
there is either a sequence of δn in which (σn, δn) is evolutionarily stable or a sequence in which (σ′n, δ′n) is
evolutionarily stable.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4 (Observing Conflicts)
Proof. We first deal with Part 1, namely, the case of a mild PD (g < l+12 ). Recall that under the observation
of conflicts, signal D denotes a conflict (at least one player defected), and C denotes mutual cooperation.
Let TFT, TF2T, TFTq (and similarly, TFTξ, TF2Tξ, TFTq,ξ) be defined in an analogous way to the proof
of Theorem 3. Let σ be the strategy that assigns mass q (defined below) to TFT and mass 1− q to TF2T ,
and let σ′ ≡ TFTq. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be a noise structure with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes. Let
η = η′ ≡ c. Let δ¯ be a number that is sufficiently small relative to 1k·(l+g+1) . For each n ≥ 1, let δn = δ¯/n.
Let σn (σ′n) be the closest strategy to σ (σ′) in Σζ,δn .
We now show that there exists sequences of consistent outcomes ηn and η′n such that ηn, η′n → c as n→∞.
For each s ∈ C (σn) or s ∈ C (σ′n), let Pr
(
D,
−→
C |s
)
and Pr (D,D, ...|s) denote, respectively, the probability
of observing exactly one D, and the probability of observing at least two Ds, conditional on the partner
following strategy s. Let Pr
(
D,
−→
C
)
and Pr (D,D, ...) be the corresponding unconditional probabilities in
configuration (σn, ηn). Calculations analogous to those explicitly detailed in the proof of Theorem 3 enable
us to find Pr
(
D,
−→
C |s
)
and Pr (D,D, ...|s) for each strategy s. In particular, as in the previous analysis,
the incumbents will very rarely be observed to have two or more conflicts: Pr (D,D, ...|TFTq,ξ) = O
(
δ2n
)
.
(As in the proof of Theorem 3 we simplify the exposition by letting TFT q,ξ denote the strategy that puts
probability q on TFTξ and probability 1 − q on TF2Tξ in configuration (σn, ηn).) Next we calculate the
average probability of a player observing a single conflict conditional on the partner following a non-noisy
strategy:
Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
= O (δn) + q · 2 · k · Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
⇒ Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
= O (δn)1− 2 · k · q . (3)
This expression is derived as follows. The probability that a non-noisy agent has a conflict with a noisy agent
is O (δn) since this is the fraction of noisy agents. A non-noisy agent defects against another non-noisy agent
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with an an average probability of q if he observes D,−→C . This observation happens with a probability of
2 · k ·Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
+O (δn) (because in each of the observed k interactions, the two interacting agents
each induce a conflict by defecting with an average probability of Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
.
The terms represented by O (δn) in Eq. 3 are positive. Thus since Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
> 0 it must be the
case that
2 · k · q < 1⇔ k · q < 0.5.
By Bayes’ rule we can calculate the conditional probability Pr
(
s|D,−→C
)
of being matched with each strategy
s ∈ C (σn) as a function of the observed message (similar to the calculations detailed in the proof of Theorem
3). Let µ be the probability that a partner defects conditional on the player observing a message D,−→C about
the partner, and conditional on the partner observing the message −→C :
µ =
∑
s∈S
Pr
(
s|D,−→C
)
· s−→
C
(D) +O (δn) . (4)
Note that µ is decreasing in q (as a larger q implies a higher probability of Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFT
)
). Moreover, as
q ↗ 12·k we have µ (q)↘ 0 because Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFT
)
“explodes” as we approach the threshold of k · q = 0.5.
Next, we calculate the value of q that balances the payoffs of both actions when a player observes a single
conflict (neglecting terms of O (δn)). The LHS of the following equation represents a player’s direct gain from
defecting in the rare case in which he observes a single conflict, while the RHS represents the player’s indirect
loss from defecting in this case, which is induced by other partners who defect as a result of observing these
defections. Note that the cost is paid only if the partner cooperated, as otherwise other partners observe D
regardless of the agent’s own action.
µ · l + (1− µ) · g = (1− µ) · k · q · (l + 1) ⇔ q = µ · l + (1− µ) · g(1− µ) · k · (l + 1) . (5)
In connection with Eq. 5 it was noted that q (µ) is increasing in µ, and since the PD is mild we have
q (0) = gk·(l+1) <
1
2·k . This implies that there are (unique) values of
g
k·(l+1) < q <
1
2·k and 0 < µ < 1 that
jointly solve Eqs. 4 and 5. By standard continuity arguments, for any n, there exists a nearby frequency
qn = q +O (δn) that balances the payoffs of the two actions.
The remaining arguments are analogous to those in the final part of the proof of Theorem 3, and are
omitted for brevity.
Next, we deal with Part 2, namely, the case of an acute PD (g > 0.5 · (l + 1)). Cooperation can be
perfectly neutrally stable only if non-noisy agents: (1) cooperate with probability one after they observe −→C
(otherwise the outcome cannot converge to full cooperation as the noise converges to zero), and (2) defect (on
average) with positive probability after they observe
(
D,
−→
C
)
. This is because otherwise a mutant who defects
with a probability of 0 <  << 1, regardless of the observed signal, would earn a direct gain of O () from
defecting, but suffer an indirect loss of at most O
(
2
)
due to these defections (since non-noisy incumbents
defect only when they observe at least two conflicts, which happens with a probability of k ·O (2)).
Let q > 0 denote the average probability of a player defecting after he observes
(
D,
−→
C
)
. The fact that q
is positive implies that defection must be a best reply after a player observes a single conflict. This implies
that q should be at least equal to the minimal solution of Eq. (5): q (µ = 0) = gk·(l+1) (assuming that the
level of noise is sufficiently low). However, if the game is acute, then this minimal solution is larger than
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2·k . This implies, due to Eq. (3), that an arbitrarily small group of mutants who always defect would cause
the incumbents to defect with high probability, which implies that no focal post-entry population exists, and
thus cooperation cannot be neutrally stable.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5 (Observing Unilateral Defections)
Proof. Let G be a standard PD (i.e., g < l + 1). Recall that under the observation of unilateral defections,
D is the signal for a unilateral defection of the partner, and C is the signal for all other action profiles. Let
TFT, TF2T, TFTq (and similarly, TFTξ, TF2Tξ, TFTq,ξ) be defined in an analogous way to the proof of
Theorem 3. Let σ be the strategy that assigns mass q (defined below) to TFT and mass 1 − q to TF2T ,
and let σ′ ≡ TFTq. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be a noise structure with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes. Let
η = η′ ≡ c. Let δ¯ be a number that is sufficiently small relative to 1k·(l+g+1) . For each n ≥ 1, let δn = δ¯/n.
Let σn (σ′n) be the closest strategy to σ (σ′) in Σζ,δn .
We now show the existence of a consistent outcome ηn (η′n) in which ηn, η′n → c as n → ∞. For
each s ∈ C (σn) (s ∈ C (σ′n)), let Pr
(
D,
−→
C |s
)
and Pr (D,D, ...|s) denote, respectively, the probability
of observing exactly one D, and the probability of observing at least two Ds, conditional on the partner
following strategy s. Let Pr
(
D,
−→
C
)
and Pr (D,D, ...)) be the corresponding unconditional probabilities in
configuration (σn, ηn). Calculations analogous to those explicitly detailed in the proof of Theorem 3 enable
us to find Pr
(
D,
−→
C |s
)
and Pr (D,D, ...|s) for each strategy s. In particular, as in the previous analysis,
the incumbents will very rarely be observed to have two or more Ds: Pr (D,D, ...|TFTq,ξ) = O
(
δ2n
)
. Next,
we calculate the order of magnitude of Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
(the average probability that a player observes a
single unilateral defection conditional on the partner following a non-noisy strategy):
Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
= O (δn) + q · k · Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
⇒ Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
= O (δn)1− k · q . (6)
This expression is derived as follows. The probability that a non-noisy agent unilaterally defects against a
noisy agent is O (δn) since this is the fraction of noisy agents. A non-noisy agent defects against another non-
noisy agent with an average probability of q if he observes
(
D,
−→
C
)
(and this defection is a unilateral defection
with a probability of 1−O (δn)). This observation happens with a probability of k·Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
+O (δn)
(because in each of the observed k interactions, the partner unilaterally defects with an average probability
of Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
.
The terms represented by O (δn) in Eq. 6 are positive. Thus since Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
> 0 we have
Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
= O (δn)⇔ k · q < 1⇔ k · q < 1.
By using Bayes’ rule we can calculate the conditional probability Pr
(
s|D,−→C
)
for being matched with each
strategy s ∈ C (σn) as a function of the observed message (explicit calculations were presented in the proof
of Theorem 3). Let µ be the probability that a partner defects conditional on the player observing message(
D,
−→
C
)
about the partner, and conditional on the partner observing the message −→C :
µ =
∑
s∈S
Pr
(
s|D,−→C
)
· s−→
C
(D) +O (δn) . (7)
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Note that µ is decreasing in q (as a larger q implies a larger Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
). Moreover, as q ↗ 1k ,
µ (q)↘ 0 because Pr
(
D,
−→
C |TFTq,ξ
)
“explodes” as k · q ↗ 1.
Next, we calculate the value of q that balances the payoffs of both actions when a player observes a single
unilateral defection (neglecting terms of O (δn)). The LHS of the Eq. (8) presents the direct gain from
defecting in these cases, while the RHS presents the indirect loss from these defections as a result of inducing
other partners who observe these interactions to defect. Observe that the cost is paid only if the partner
cooperates, as otherwise the signal C would be observed regardless of the agent’s action.
µ · l + (1− µ) · g = (1− µ) · k · q · (l + 1) ⇔ q = µ · l + (1− µ) · g(1− µ) · k · (l + 1) . (8)
Observe, that q (µ) is increasing in µ, and q (0) = gk·(l+1) <
1
k (due to the PD being “standard”). This implies
that there are (unique) values of gk·(l+1) < q <
1
k and 0 < µ < 1 that jointly solve Eqs. 7 and 8. By standard
continuity arguments, for any n, there exists a nearby frequency q + O (δn) that balances the payoff of the
two strategies. The remaining arguments are analogous to those in the last part of the proof of Theorem 3,
and are omitted for brevity.
Next, we deal with Part 2, namely, the case of an inefficient PD (g > l + 1). Assume to the contrary,
that cooperation is a perfectly neutrally stable outcome. Cooperation can be the outcome of the limit of the
perfectly neutrally stable configurations only if non-noisy agents cooperate with probability one after they
observe −→C . Moreover, the stability of cooperation requires that the non-noisy agents defect (on average)
with positive probability after they observe
(
D,
−→
C
)
(otherwise mutants who defect with a probability of
0 <  << 1, regardless of the observed signal, would earn a direct gain of O () from defecting, but suffer a
smaller indirect loss of at most k ·O (2) due to these defections).
Let q denote the average probability of defection after players observe
(
D,
−→
C
)
. The fact that non-noisy
agents defect with positive probability after observing
(
D,
−→
C
)
implies that cooperation should be a best
reply when a player who almost always cooperates observes
(
D,
−→
C
)
. This implies that q should be at least
equal to the minimal solution of Eq. (5): q (µ = 0) = gk·(l+1) (assuming that the level of noise is sufficiently
low). However, if the game is inefficient, then the minimal solution of the equation, gk·(l+1) >
1
k , which implies
by Eq. (3) that an arbitrarily small group of mutants who defect with small probability would cause the
incumbents to unilaterally defect with high probability, and thus no focal post-entry population would exist,
which contradicts the assumption that cooperation is perfectly neutrally stable.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6 (Observing Action Profiles)
Proof. We begin with case 1, in which G is a mild PD. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be a noise structure in which ξ ≡ 0,17
where S contains a single strategy sα that defects with a small probability of 0 < α << 1k regardless of
the observed signal.18 Let TF2T be the strategy that defects iff the observed message includes at least two
interactions in which the action profile is different from mutual cooperation. Let TFT be the strategy that
defects if the observed message includes either (1) at least two interactions in which the action profile is
different from mutual cooperation, or (2) at least one interaction in which the partner was the sole defector.
17The assumption that ξ ≡ 0 is taken to simplify the arguments, but it does not play an essential role in the proof.
18In order to satisfy the requirement of Definition 4 that S includes two different strategies with different defection probability,
we can slightly adapt the construction and have S to include two noisy strategies, such that the first (second) strategy defects
with a probability of 1.001 · α (0.999 · α).
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Let σ∗ be the strategy that assigns mass q (defined below) to TFT and mass 1 − q to TF2T. Let η∗ ≡ c.
Let δ¯ be a number that is sufficiently small relative to 1/(k · (l + g + 1)). For each n ≥ 1, let δn = δ¯/n. Let
σn ∈ Σζ,δn be the closest strategy to σ∗ in Σζ,δn . We now show the existence of a consistent outcome ηn in
which ηn → η∗ ≡ c as n→∞.
Let Pr
(
sα| (d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
be the probability that the partner follows strategy sα conditional on the player
observing a signal profile with a single unilateral defection by the partner, and k − 1 mutual cooperations.
Let µ be the probability that the partner of a non-noisy agent defects conditional on the agent observing(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
. Note, that µ = α · Pr
(
sα| (d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
+ O (δn) because the non-noisy strategies cooperate
with maximal probability upon observing
(−−→
(c, c)
)
. The value of q is defined to make an agent, who almost
always cooperates, indifferent between cooperation and defection when he observes message
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
,
namely:
µ · l + (1− µ) · g = (1− µ) · k · q · (l + 1) ⇔ q = µ · l + (1− µ) · g(1− µ) · k · (l + 1) . (9)
For a sufficiently small α, the value of q (µ) that solves Eq. (9) will be slightly above q (µ = 0) = gl+1 . The
fact that the PD is mild implies that (for a sufficiently small α) k · q < 0.5.
Let p be the average probability with which the non-noisy players defect when being matched with sα.
When α << 1k , the TF2T agents rarely (O
(
α2
)
) defect against the noisy agents, because it is rare to
observe them defecting more than once. The TFT agents defect against the sα-agents with a probability
of k · q · α + O (α2) because each rare defection of the s-agents is observed with a probability of k · q by
TFT-agents. As both α, p << 1, it implies that bilateral defections are very rare ((O
(
α2
)
). This implies
that p = α · k · q +O (α2) < α2 .
Let r be the probability that a TFT agent defects against a fellow TFT agent. In each observed interaction,
the TFT partner interacts with a noisy (resp., TFT, TF2T) opponent with a probability of δn (resp., q, 1-q)
and the partner unilaterally defects with a probability of α · k · q + O (α2) (resp., r + O (r2), O (δn · α2)).
This implies that r solves the following equation:
r = k · (α · q · δn + q · r) +O
(
δ2n
) ⇒ r = α · k · q1− k · q · δn +O (δ2n + α2 · δn) < 0.5 · α · δn,
where the latter inequality is because k · q < 0.5. The above calculations show that the total frequency with
which noisy agents unilaterally defect (α · δn) is higher than the total frequency with which non-noisy agents
defect (q + p · δn < α · δn). This implies that the probability that an agent is noisy, conditional on his being
the sole defector in an interaction, is higher than 50%, and that it is larger than this probability conditional
on his being the sole cooperator. Next, note that mutual defections between a noisy and a TFT agent have
a frequency of O (δn), while mutual defections between two noisy agents (or two non-noisy agents) are very
rare (O
(
δ2n
)
), which implies that the probability that the partner follows a noisy strategy conditional on the
player observing mutual defection is 50%+O (δn). This implies that
Pr
(
sα| (d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
> max
(
Pr
(
sα| (d, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
> Pr
(
sα| (c, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
))
,
and thus while both actions are best replies after the player observes the message
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
, only coop-
eration is a best reply after the player observes
(
(d, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
and
(
(c, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
. Next note that conditional
on a player observing a message with at most k − 2 mutual cooperations, the partner is most likely to be
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a noisy agent (because non-noisy agents have two outcomes different from mutual cooperation with a prob-
ability of O
(
δ2n
)
. This implies that the non-noisy agents play the unique best-reply after any signal other
than
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
, and thus any small group of mutants who behave differently in these cases will be out-
performed. The stability with respect to mutants who differ in their behavior after
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
is derived
by analogous arguments as in the end of the proof of Theorem 3.
Next we show that cooperation is not perfectly neutrally stable for all (some) noise structures in acute
(mild) PDs. Note that both the direct payoff and the indirect payoff of an action (the latter payoff being due
to the influence of the action on the behavior of other partners) depend only on the conditional probability
that the partner defects. In order to support stable cooperation, cooperation (defection) should be the unique
best reply against a partner who is going to cooperate (defect) for sure, and both actions should be best
replies to some conditional probability strictly between zero and one. Moreover, non-noisy agents should
defect with positive probability when they observe
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
(as otherwise defecting with a probability
of 0 <  << 1 against cooperative partners would be profitable). This can be the case only if conditional
on a player observing
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
there is a positive probability that the partner follows a noisy strategy
(and that this probability is higher than the conditional probability when the player observes
(−−→
(c, c)
)
. Note
also that all non-noisy agents must defect with probability one when they observe at least two interactions
with outcomes different from mutual cooperation, (because then it is most likely that the partner is a noisy
agent, and the conditional probability that the partner defects is higher than when the player observes(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
).
We first show that there exists a noise structure ζ such that cooperation is not perfectly neutrally stable
with respect to ζ for any mild PD. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be a noise structure in which: (1) ξ ≡ 0 (but the proof can
be adapted to ξ > 0), and (2) all the noisy strategies in S defect with a probability higher than 23 regardless of
the observed signal. In what follows, we show that the non-noisy players defect with probability one against
those non-noisy agents. Let sα ∈ S be a noisy strategy that defects with a probability of α regardless of the
signal. The following inequality bounds 1− p from above:
1− p ≤ ((1− α) · (1− p))k + k · ((1− α) · (1− k))k−1 · (1− (1− α) · (1− p)) ,
because a non-noisy agent cooperates (the LHS) only if observes at least k − 1 mutual cooperations (the
RHS). If p < 1 we can divide by 1− p and get:
1 ≤ (1− α)k · (1− p)k−1 + k · (1− α)k−1 · (1− k)k−1 · (1− (1− α) · (1− p)) .
Note that α > 23 implies that (1− α)k < 19 and k · (1− α)k−1 < 23 , which implies that the RHS is less than 1,
and we get a contradiction. Thus it must be that p = 1; i.e., the non-noisy players always defect against the
noisy agents. This implies that the probability that the partner is a noisy player conditional on the player
observing
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
is zero, and we get a contradiction.
Now we deal with case 2, in which the PD is acute, and the noise structure is arbitrary. Assume to the
contrary, that cooperation is a perfectly neutrally stable outcome. Let ζ = (ξ,S, λ) be the supporting noise
structure (with a grain of full-support strategy mistakes). For each noise level δn, let qn > 0 be the average
probability according to which a non-noisy incumbent defects when he observes
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
. Let q be the
limit of qn when δn converges to zero. Eq. (2) and the arguments associated with it show that k · q > g(l+1)
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is necessary for cooperation to be a best reply for a player who observes
(−−→
(c, c)
)
. Recall that in acute PDs
g
(l+1) >
1
2 ⇒ k · q > 12 .
Let sα ∈ S be a noisy strategy that induces an agent who follows it (called sα-agent) to defect with a
probability of α > 0 when he observes
(−−→
(c, c)
)
. In what follows we show that the presence of strategy sα
induces the non-noisy agents to unilaterally defect more often than sα-agents do so. Let p be the average
probability that non-noisy agents defect against sα-agents. This probability p must solve the following
inequality:
1− p ≥ ((1− α) · (1− k))k + k · ((1− α) · (1− k))k−1 · (1− (1− α) · (1− p)) (10)
+ (1− q) · k · ((1− α) · (1− k))k−1 · α · (1− p) .
The LHS of (10) is the average probability that non-noisy agents cooperate against sα-agents (recall that
non-noisy agents always defect when they observe less than k − 1 mutual cooperations). The non-noisy
agents cooperate with probability one (resp., at most one, q) if they observe
(−−→
(c, c)
)
(resp.,
(
(d, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
or
(
(c, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
,
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
), which happens with a probability of ((1− α) · (1− k))k (resp.,
k · ((1− α) · (1− k))k−1 · (1− (1− α) · (1− p)), k · ((1− α) · (1− k))k−1 · α · (1− p)).
Direct numerical analysis of Eq. (10) shows that the minimal p that solves this inequality (given that
q > 12·k ) is greater than
α
2−α for any 0 < α < 1. The total frequency of interactions in which the sα-agents
unilaterally defect is α · (1− p) · δ · λ (s) . The total frequency of interactions in which non-noisy agents
unilaterally defect against the sα-agents is p · (1− α) · δ ·λ (s). Eq. (7) shows that these unilateral defections
against sα-agents induce the non-noisy agents to unilaterally defect among themselves with a total frequency
of p·(1−α)·δ·λ(s)1−k·q > p · (1− α) · δ · λ (s). Finally, note that p > α2−α⇔ 2 · p · (1− α) > α · (1− p) implies that
non-noisy agents unilaterally defect (as the indirect result of the presence of the s-agents) more often than
those in which the sα-agents do.
Next, observe that bilateral defections are most likely to occur in interactions between noisy and non-noisy
agents. This is because the probability that both non-noisy agents defect against each other is only O
(
δ2
)
.
Thus, when a player observes bilateral defection the partner is more likely to be a noisy agent than when the
player observes a unilateral defection by the partner. This implies that all the non-noisy agents defect with
probability one when they observe
(
(d, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
because in this case defection is the unique best reply.
Let w be the (average) probability that non-noisy agents defect when they observe
(
(c, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
. If
w < 0.5, then cooperation is the unique best reply for a non-noisy agent who faces a partner who is likely to
defect (e.g., when they observe fewer than k− 1 mutual cooperations), and so we get a contradiction. This is
because defecting against a defector yields a direct gain of l and an indirect loss of at least 0.5 · k · (l + 1) ≥
l + 1 > l (because this bilateral defection will be observed on average k times, and in at least half of these
cases it will induce the partner to defect, whereas if the agent were cooperating, then he would have induced
the partner to cooperate).
Thus, w ≥ 0.5⇒ k · w > 1. However, in this case, analogous arguments to those after Eq. (6) imply
that an arbitrarily small group of mutants who defect with small probability would cause the incumbents to
unilaterally defect with high probability, and thus no focal post-entry population exists, which contradicts
the assumption that cooperation is neutrally stable.
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A.7 Proof of Prop. 1 (Strict Equilibrium is Perfectly Stable)
Proof. Let k¯ = argmax (C (p)). Let l be the minimal loss from playing a 6= a∗ against a∗:
l = mina 6=a∗ (pi (a∗, a∗)− pi (a, a∗)) . Let g be the highest possible payoff in the game: g = maxa,a′ pi (a, a′).
Let τ be sufficiently small with respect to lg . Let sˆ be the strategy that plays a∗ with a probability of 1−τ ,
and plays each other action with a probability of τ|A| . Let ζ = (ξ = 0,S = {sˆ} , λ = 1) be a noise structure
that includes a single source of noise: the strategy sˆ that plays a∗ with high probability. Let (δn)n → 0 be
any sequence of noise level converging to 0. Let σn be the closest strategy to a∗ in Σζ,δn : σn (a∗) = 1− δ · λ.
Let ηn be the unique consistent outcome of σn. It is immediate that (σn, ηn) → (d, d). Fix n. We have to
show that (σn, ηn) is an evolutionarily stable configuration in the perturbed environment (E, p, ζ, δn).
Let ¯ be sufficiently small with respect to l
k¯·g . Let 0 <  < ¯. Let σ
′ 6= σn ∈ Σζ,δn be a mutant
strategy. Let (σ, η) be an -post-entry configuration. It is immediate that (σ, η) is 0-focal because all the
incumbents play the same regardless of the observed message. We have to show that the mutants are strictly
outperformed. The mutants play a∗ with a strictly lower probability than the incumbents (because σ′ 6= σn
and all messages are observed on the equilibrium path). Let β be the difference between the probability of
playing a∗ by the mutants and by the incumbents, when facing an incumbent. An analogous argument to
the one in Theorem 1 above shows that the maximal probability, α¯, that one mutant plays an action different
from a∗ against another mutant is at most
α¯ ≤ k¯ · (β +  · 2 · α¯)⇒ α¯ ≤ k¯ · β1−  · 2 .
The mutants suffer a direct loss of β · l from their lower probability of playing a∗ against the incumbents.
Their indirect gain (from inducing other mutants to play more favorably towards them) is at most  · α¯ · g.
Thus the loss outweighs the gain if:
 · α¯ · g = k¯ · β ·  · g1−  · 2 < β · l,
which holds for our choice of ¯ as sufficiently small.
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